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I.  Overview and Introduction 
 
Homeland security is clearly an integral part of federal government national defense 
planning and budgeting. Within the DOD in 2003, leaders spoke of winning the war on 
terrorism as “an away game,” indicating efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere as 
their models. Nonetheless, steps have been taken to prepare for homeland defense as a 
home game. Key homeland security events since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks 
have brought a new recognition of a missing element in defense strategy, the internal 
defense of the homeland. Subsequent to much debate, the Department of Homeland 
Security was created and a separate homeland security appropriation has been provided. 
Both defense and homeland security are threat-based budgets that must predict the future 
to anticipate what events an enemy might consider and then fund actions to deter or 
defeat those actions. This takes a special kind of budget system, one not based on 
incremental reactions to the events of the previous year. The Department of Defense has 
had such a budget system in place since 1964. In this report, we examine that system and 
ask what lessons can be learned for homeland security budgeting from DOD’s experience 
with its Planning-Programming-Budgeting system. 
 
Little doubt exits that the threat to homeland security is real and of some magnitude. Says 
former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich: 
 
“The threat of large-scale death has been estimated at 80% biological, 19 and a half 
percent nuclear, and only about one-half of one per cent chemical. Only by examining the 
history of new diseases in unprepared populations can we begin to understand the 
horrendous threat that is emerging but still largely ignored. The flu epidemic of 1918 
killed more Americans than the entire First World War. The introduction of new diseases 
shattered the Aztec and Inca civilizations after the arrival of the Spanish. Hawaiians may 
have lost up to 90% of their population to new diseases. Some North American tribes lost 
up to 96% of their people in specific villages. Even in populations that had historically 
experienced disease, the right circumstances have created shattering impacts. The plague 
of 1348-49 killed up to one-third of the people in European cities it hit.” (Gingrich, 
Testimony, 2003.) 
 
In addition to the federal government, state and local governments are important partners 
in meeting these threats, yet the threat persists at a time when state and local governments 
are in fiscal crisis. Budget crises have strained state and local law enforcement agencies, 
and the Homeland Security grants were slow to reach their designated beneficiaries. In 
2002, a survey by the Boston Globe found that the 10 largest police departments in 
Massachusetts had 424 fewer officers than they did a year ago and will lose at least 50 
more by July 1 as a result of state budget cuts in local aid. The state has received its 
allotted $11.7 million in homeland security grants, but Gov. Milt Romney (R) and other 
state officials estimate their costs at almost five times that amount. In Yuma County, 
Ariz., home to two U.S. military bases, Sheriff Ralph E. Ogden said the most pressing 
need is a multimillion-dollar radio system that would allow federal, state and local 
officials to communicate in an emergency. "We probably have 50 police or law 
enforcement agencies within 60 miles of where I'm sitting right now and very few of us 
can talk to each other," Ogden said (Russakoff and Sanchez 2003). 
The Brookings Institution (2002) said that given the nation's many unaddressed domestic 
security needs, the homeland security budget passed in 2002 should have been as much 
as $10 billion higher than the $38 Bush proposed. Brookings noted that this was a 
complicated process, and apparent solutions might not be as effective as thought: 
 
"The primary focus of Washington policymakers in 2002, creation of a department of 
homeland security . . . will not in and of itself make Americans safer," Brookings warned. 
"To the contrary, the complexity of merging so many disparate agencies threatens to 
distract from other more urgent security efforts." Others suggest that homeland security 
may be underfunded for years to come (Mintz and Lee, 2003). Still it is hard to see how 
the creation of the Department of Homeland Security was not an important and useful 
first step. Naturally with the creation of the DHS in 2002,  complex issues remained, 
including integration of 22 agencies, 180,000 people, different cultures, regionalization, 
and the blend of federal, state, local efforts, co-ordination with private sector (e.g. 
 2
airlines) and functional co-ordination with other federal agencies, e.g. CDC or National 
Parks. 
 
It is obvious that the response to terrorist threats has taken multiple aspects, including the 
issuance of the National Strategy for Homeland Security that defined homeland security 
as a concerted national effort to accomplish three major missions: Prevent terrorist 
attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism and 
minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. At the federal level, the 
Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296) structures the federal organization -- the 
Department of the Homeland Security (DHS) -- to implement the National Strategy 
through federal efforts and the marshalling of state, local and private initiatives. Other 
legislation, such as the USA Patriot Act, has provided new tools for law enforcement and 
surveillance. At other government levels and in the private sector, organizational and 
policy changes have stressed the new demands for security. The Federal Office of 
Management and Budget has asked for comments on how to improve the cost benefit 
analysis of regulations to homeland security. These events and others highlight how 
difficult it is to craft homeland security as a mission area over the long term, for several 
reasons. 
  
It is also obvious that more needs to be done. Officials will need to define discrete 
homeland security outcomes of prevention, protection and responses in objective, 
quantifiable and measurable forms. Federal agencies, still struggling with setting goals 
and measuring results for long-standing programs, likely will struggle with this new 
mission area. Moreover, homeland security is a national mission and will need to reflect 
performance at the very lowest local level and at the very highest federal level. Other 
goals, such as economic security, on their face call for objectives such as the free flow of 
goods that bump up against border and transportation security. 
 
Fashioning partnership programs operating within and across policy and operational 
communities such as border control, public health, transportation and intelligence and 
information sharing will be difficult. In addition, homeland security programs are 
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primarily intergovernmental, thus running into long-held understandings of the role of the 
federal and state and local governments. Not to be forgotten are the vital roles of the 
private sector and the international community. Still, first steps have been taken with the 
creation of DHS which gives the federal government an organized strategic focus on 
homeland security. Moreover, the funding issues involved in the routines of the budget 
process will allow for examination of critical priorities on a routine basis in deciding on 
what to fund and for routine oversight of what has been funded and what has been 
accomplished.  
 
Funding for homeland security has increased and not just at the federal level... Federal 
budget requests have rapidly expanded since the September 11 terrorist attacks. For 
example, the President’s FY 2004 budget request for DHS is $36.2 billion, representing a 
7.4 percent increase over FY 2003 and 64 percent increase over FY 2002. A recent FY 
2003 supplemental appropriation has added more billions to the total. State and local 
governments and the private sector have also taken on substantial homeland security 
costs. For example, the National Strategy used estimates indicating that states’ costs for 
additional homeland security activities would reach $6 billion in the time from September 
11 through the end of 2002. Cities had estimated costs of $2.6 billion. Private sector 
expenses for fighting terrorism were estimated to increase by 50 to 100 percent over the 
$55 billion spent annually before September 11. The U.S. Conference of Mayors recently 
estimated that cities spend a combined $70 million more on homeland security each week 
when the national threat level is orange, compared to when it is yellow.  
 
Establishing the DHS was the largest government restructuring in the past fifty years. 
Twenty-two different agencies with different organizational cultures representing more 
than 100 separate offices have been merged into this new entity. The protection of 
American lives and way of life to some extent depend upon the successful integration of 
a number of existing government agencies with distinct and separate operating 
procedures. DHS will include at least 180,000 employees previously covered and 
managed under more than one hundred separate personal management systems. 
Managers at DHS have to renegotiate contracts with at least 18 labor unions, including 
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the 33,000 member American Federation of Government Employees, and the 12,000 
members of the National Treasury Employees Union. Among the controversial elements 
of this reorganization, the new Secretary has the authority to design a new personnel 
system that is more flexible than the current federal civil service system. The DHS 
experiment is important to personnel management because the new federal department 
promises to increase managerial flexibility by reducing or eliminating employee civil 
service status and reducing union representation. While the major mission of the 
department is external, how well it handles these seemingly mundane administrative 
matters will have significant consequences for how effective it is at accomplishing its 
main mission: defending the homeland.  
 
II. DHS Descriptors: size and shape 




The table above (Brookings, 2002a: 9) tells us the dollar and personnel size and 
distribution of the DHS, including: 
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• The largest part of the Department comes from Immigration, Customs, and Coast 
Guard, agencies basically charged with focusing on and protecting borders, 
although Coast Guard has a significant water safety image.  
• DHS includes the Secret Service whose primary function is to protect the 
President. 
• DHS has two “offensive” programs, in CBRN Countermeasures and Information 
Analysis. These are very small functions. 
 
The largest program involves Border and Transportation Security. The exhibit below 
indicates that it alone has 46% of the budget and 69% of the personnel of the total 
Department. It also includes agencies that were formerly associated with five other 
federal departments, the largest of these coming from the Department of Transportation. 
This component is about split between the Coast Guard an old line agency with historic 
traditions and the new airport security functions of the Department of Transportation. 
This leaves the DHS with mixed missions, mixed traditions and corporate cultures and a 
mission without a corporate culture. Corporate cultures are important because they help 
leaders and followers understand both what is important and how it should be carried out 
as it pertains to the Departmental mission. It is no secret that the force multiplier in HS is 
cooperation between Federal and state and local law enforcement programs. Good 
relationships based on positive culture and a history of good relationships makes these 
efforts easier and more effective. For example, the Coast Guard generally has a very 
positive local image, thanks in part to its use of the Coast Guard Auxiliary. At the other 
extreme are the FBI and to a lesser extent the Secret Service, agencies with a clear federal 
mission, both secretive, and in the FBI’s case with a rather negative image about 
relationships with local law enforcement. While the FBI contributes a relatively small 
amount to the new department ($150 million and 800 people) it is interesting to see that 
its major contribution for DHS is in Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
and appears to be an information sharing function. Altogether, the DHS drew from 
nineteen programs in twelve federal departments and has been given a new responsibility 
in Biological Warfare Defense Analysis. The Departments of Transportation and 
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Treasury clearly gave the most budget share to DHS, losing 30% and 27% of their budget 
share from 2001 to 2002.1 
 
According to the FY2004 budget, some $41.34 billion is proposed for homeland security 
spending in 2004. About $24 billion of this will fall within the purview of DHS (58.5%). 
The rest is scattered among fifteen major Departments. Net non-defense discretionary 
homeland security budget authority is estimated at $28,239 billion for FY2004. This 
would be the amount that will constitute the non-defense budget base for homeland 
security in future years. 2 
 
Materials presented with the budget indicate that DHS has or will take important steps to 
re-organize. For instance, during its first year, DHS will unify four different border 
inspection functions into one. It will link existing information systems into a cohesive 
network—reengineering the $3 billion spent annually by these agencies on information 
technology. It will merge 15 different compensation systems into a unified compensation 
system that rewards employee performance. And it will consolidate at least 19 different 
financial management systems into an integrated system. 
 
In addition to these changes, DHS will create a powerful and logical regional structure. 
Currently, some of the major agencies being merged into DHS—the INS, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, the Customs Service, and the Coast Guard—maintain a 
unique regional structure and lines of authority which lead separately back to 
Washington. This current field structure of existing agencies spans 42 districts, 21 
sectors, and 20 management centers domestically, as well as over 100 international 
offices in 43 countries. The redundant structure has eroded accountability, blurred lines 
of responsibility, and led to duplicative efforts. 
 
DHS will have one regional structure with directors within each geographic area in 
charge of all operations. The regional directors will report directly to the Secretary.  
                                                 
1 (Table S-6, Summary Tables, US Budget For FY2004: 316).  
2 ( Summary Table S-5, US Budget For FY2004: p. 315). 
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 The Coast Guard will be an exception given its distinct military mission, and will 
continue to report to the Commandant of the Coast Guard who will report to the 
Secretary. This reform will not only clarify responsibility but also provide a platform to 
clearly develop and broadcast the Department’s vision and corporate culture. Securing 
US borders is a primary challenge for DHS. It is an enormous task. Ports-of-entry into the 
United States stretch across 7,500 miles of land border between the United States and 
Mexico and Canada and 95,000 miles of shoreline and navigable rivers. Each year more 
than 500 million persons, 130 million motor vehicles, 2.5 million railcars, and 5.7 million 
cargo containers must be inspected at the border. The conditions and venues where the 
tasks are performed vary considerably, from air and sea ports-of-entry in metropolitan 
New York City with dozens of employees to a two person land entry point in Montana. 
 
Other Near-term Challenges 
DHS encounters an enormous challenge to reorganize and integrate roughly 22 disparate 
agencies with nearly 180,000 employees into four mission organizations. During the next 
two years, the Department will focus on these near-term challenges:  
 
1. For example, in the area of human capital, most of the 22 combining agencies have at 
present unique personnel systems. DHS will blend the personnel systems of the incoming 
22 agencies into a unified system that is consistent, coherent, and rewards good 
performance. Strategic use of managerial flexibilities is essential in order to put the right 
person, in the right place, at the right time. 
 
2. DHS also faces the challenge of targeting its $36.2 billion budget to efforts that meet 
its central mission. Budgetary flexibility is essential to enabling the Department to 
redirect funds from obsolete or low priority programs to homeland priorities.   
 
3. DHS inherits agencies in various financial conditions with numerous financial systems. 
DHS must work to unify the 19 existing systems and ensure that the chosen system 
directly links performance with spending.  
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 4. In addition, the Department is committed to developing concrete performance 
milestones upon which to hold its managers and employees accountable.  
 
In the area of information technology, the Department is faced with the challenge of 
integrating hundreds of “stovepipe” systems into a coherent operating network. 
Communication and information sharing is essential to preventing another terrorist 
attack. The goal is to have modern information technology systems that efficiently and 
effectively support homeland security missions, enhance productivity, facilitate 
information sharing, and generate budgetary savings. DHS will focus on developing a 
solid, coherent infrastructure; developing business management cases for all of its 
inherited systems to determine whether they should continue operation; and evaluating 
mission-related systems to identify overlap and opportunities for improvement. DHS will 
participate in the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) evaluations process. These 
reflect a collaborative effort between the Office of Management and Budget and the 
various policy officials within the respective departments. Nine PART analyses were 
conducted for programs moved to DHS. Because DHS is a new department, it will 
undertake performance evaluations of its programs over the next two years (see 
appendix). 
 
III. Congressional Relationships 
 
Not surprisingly, homeland security has a very complex historical relationship with 
Congress. As the exhibit below indicates, the new Department of Homeland Security 
must face 13 committees and 31 subcommittees in the Senate and the House with 
homeland security jurisdiction, for a stunning total of 62 subcommittees and 26 
committees, or 88 in total. On an annual basis, the appropriations committees would 
appear to be the most important, since they will prepare the appropriation bill. DHS has 
interest in 10 appropriation subcommittee areas. Of the substantive committees, it 
appears that those with the most saliency to DHS will be Health, Education and Labor for 
public health issues; Armed Services for emerging threats; Judiciary for immigration and 
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technology, terrorism, and government information; and Governmental Affairs for 
international security. In the House, one Judiciary subcommittee is named Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security. The House Intelligence Committee also has a 
subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security. The House tends to stake out is 
jurisdictions more narrowly and it is obvious that these committee members intend to be 
players in homeland security. The schematic below does not speak to the role of the 
Budget Committees. These committees set the total amount to be budgeted for each 
functional area and provide the targets for the appropriation bill. At $37 billion, the DHS 




In FY2004 the federal budget estimates that it will rank seventh among federal 
departments.3  While it is not the largest agency, it is too big to be handled casually, thus 
the relationship with the budget committees will be important. 
Congress must be organized to oversee HS. 
In debate leading up to the creation and passage of homeland security legislation 
Brookings (2002a p. 48 et. seq.) suggested some principles for Congress to consider. 
First, Congress was warned that a sound congressional structure for homeland security 
would have three general characteristics. First, it should institutionalize the process by 
creating bodies within Congress that have a clear mandate to oversee homeland security. 
                                                 
3 .(Table S-7 Discretionary Budget Authority by Agency The budget for Fiscal Year 2004: 317. USGPO: 
Washington, D. C.)  
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One of the ironies of congressional oversight is that formal bodies are least necessary 
when a subject is in the headlines, as homeland security is today. The urgency of the 
problem ensures members of Congress will focus on the immediate issue. The challenge 
is to create institutional arrangements that will assume sustained responsibility even after 
the issue area slips from the front pages of the nation’s newspapers. This is particularly 
true for terrorists who have proven that they are willing to wait years to extract revenge. 
Second, any congressional oversight process should minimize unnecessary fragmentation 
of responsibility within Congress. If oversight responsibilities are widely dispersed, 
Congress will find it difficult to assess trade-offs and gaps within the homeland security 
policy because each congressional entity will focus on its particular area of responsibility 
and none will be responsible for the overall program. As a result, some activities will 
become the subject of turf battles while others will fall through the cracks. (Of course, 
some fragmentation is unavoidable. The House and Senate are separate bodies. Both have 
dueling two-track processes in which some committees (the authorizers) are responsible 
for substantive policy issues and others (the appropriators) are responsible for budgetary 
issues, though in practice the dividing line between the two activities is blurred. And to 
some extent congressional fragmentation is also desirable; multiple panels lessen the 
chances that the executive branch will capture congressional oversight, and threats to 
their turf encourage committees to discharge their oversight responsibilities. But too 
much fragmentation does far more harm than good.) Third, the structure for overseeing 
homeland security should not undercut Congress’s ability to oversee other parts of 
government. September 11 brought home the seriousness of the terrorist threat; it did not 
suspend government’s other responsibilities. Congressional oversight of homeland 
security can hardly be said to be working if one consequence is that the House and Senate 
neglect other important government functions. 
 
Evaluation of homeland security activity revealed that a total of 88 Congressional 
committees were involved with homeland security, including subcommittees-with some 
sort of piece of the Homeland Security jurisdiction in 2002-3. “By one estimate, at the 
end of the 107th Congress, the membership of those 88 committees and subcommittees 
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included all 100 Senators and 412 House members. (Gingrich, Sept 9, 2003). Gingrich 
added that the House and Senate were to be praised for establishing appropriations 
subcommittees for Homeland Security. (Gingrich, Sept. 9, 2003) Gingrich further 
recommended that the House establish a subcommittee of the Budget Committee focused 
on Homeland Security. “This issue is such a matter of life and death that the Budget 
Committee should ensure it has adequate resources for Homeland Security before 
considering any other budgetary matters.” (Gingrich, Sept. 9, 2003). Gingrich suggested 
one way to go about diagnosing and reducing the reporting responsibilities for DHS 
would be for Congress to pass a joint resolution that lists the only committees that 
Secretary Ridge is required to appear before and the only committees that can require 
testimony in secret and the only subcommittees that can provide money. (Gingrich, Sept. 
9, 2003. 
 
The problem in Congress is not as bad as it seems at first glance. The 88 committee count 
may be technically accurate but it also overstates things. Most committees have very 
limited jurisdiction over homeland security (even then only if the term is defined 
broadly); bicameralism essentially doubles the number of committees; and 
subcommittees are less a sign of fragmentation than a rational means of breaking large 
jurisdictions into digestible chunks. However, the dispersal of congressional oversight of 
homeland security is considerable—far more than is necessary. INS, the Customs 
Service, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, the Coast Guard, the 
Transportation Security Administration, and FEMA together constitute 79 percent of the 
budget of the department President Bush proposed and 95 percent of its employees. 
These agencies are now primarily overseen by four authorizing committees in the House 
(Agriculture, Judiciary, Transportation and Infrastructure, and Ways and Means) and five 
in the Senate (Agriculture, Commerce, Environment and Public Works, Finance, and 
Judiciary). In addition, five different appropriations subcommittees in the House and five 
in the Senate have a say over these same agencies. Authority is badly fragmented, 
coordination problems are rife, and no one is responsible for trying to bring coherence to 
the decisions made by individual committees (Brookings, July 2002a, p. 49).  
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What to do about the authorizing committee side is less clear. From Congress’s 
perspective, revamping the appropriations subcommittees while leaving the existing 
authorization procedures in place has significant advantages. Brookings argues that the 
ideal structure would combine new appropriations committees (done) with new 
authorization committees (not done as of 12-03) (Brookings, July 2002a, pp 53-4) 
. 
“The ideal structure for congressional oversight would combine new appropriations 
subcommittees with new authorizing committees for homeland security. Brookings 
argues that such a restructuring would both institutionalize the responsibility for 
overseeing the executive branch—increasing the chances that oversight would occur even 
if events shift political appeal to other topics—and reduce fragmentation—increasing the 
chances that Congress can identify major gaps and sensible trade-offs in homeland 
security.  In such a restructuring some committees would lose oversight responsibilities 
to the new Homeland Security committee, thus members of such committees might not 
welcome such a change. Brookings argues that the House Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee and the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
Committee stand to lose the most. If President Bush’s vision carries the day, they would 
lose oversight of the Coast Guard and TSA. The House panel would also lose oversight 
of FEMA. Still, it would retain jurisdiction over issues such as highways, railroads, 
transportation safety, inland waterways, and the merchant marine. Meanwhile, its Senate 
counterpart would retain jurisdiction over all these areas plus interstate commerce and 
science policy. Brookings notes that both committees would retain broad and 
substantively important jurisdictions. Nonetheless, in 2002 some leading authorizers were 
resisting efforts to realign jurisdictions (Nather and Foerstel, 2002, 2002a). Rep. Don 
Young (R Alaska), chair of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, 
warns that legislation to reorganize the executive branch “won’t sail through Congress if 
Congress starts tampering with the committees of jurisdiction.” This sentiment seemed to 
be bipartisan. Rep. James L. Oberstar (D-Minn.), the ranking member of that committee, 
warned that “Our committee is going to fight like hell to make sure there’s no new 
Homeland Security Committee created.” 
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Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) insists that as far as the Senate is 
concerned, “We’re not going to be changing for the foreseeable future to deal with this.” 
Nather and Foerstel felt that although the opposition to new homeland security 
authorizing committees was substantial, it was neither uniform nor insurmountable. They 
pointed to various examples, such as Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.), who has 
spearheaded Senate efforts to create a homeland security department, and who argued 
that “It is hard to see how Congress could do a decent job of authorizing and overseeing 
what the new department does without a new Committee of Homeland Security…It’s that 
big.” Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), ranking member on the Senate Commerce, Science 
and Transportation Committee, said he would give up jurisdiction of the Coast Guard if it 
would help improve “America’s security.” They also found that some congressional party 
leaders also had indicated a willingness to rethink committee jurisdictions. Speaker of the 
House Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) allowed that some reorganization may be required. Senate 
Minority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) agrees, noting that “We’re going to have to rejigger 
some of the oversight responsibilities.”  
 
Newt Gingrich, in testimony before the House Rules Select Subcommittee on National 
Security, September 9, 2003 noted: 
 
“Congress has created new appropriations sub-committees for homeland security, but 
faces a more difficult issue with the authorizing committees. Instead of matching the 
President's decisive consolidation and rationalization, Congress continued with a total of 
88 Congressional committees, including subcommittees-with some sort of piece of the 
Homeland Security jurisdiction puzzle as shown on this chart. By one estimate, at the end 
of the 107th Congress, the membership of those 88 committees and subcommittees 
included all 100 Senators and 412 House members.  
 
Gingrich added:   
 
“We know from experience that this kind of diffusion does not work. For example, the 
Department of Energy, which was created during the last big federal reorganization in 
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1977, only answers to 17 committees and is still considered "a model of how NOT to 
make a department.” 
 
Gingrich observed: “Much of Homeland Security is a function of dual use. First 
responders spend virtually all their time on policing, fire fighting and similar vital but not 
national security behaviors. The time and resources needed for a national security crisis 
in our homeland have to be layered on top of existing activities without hindering the 
hard work already undertaken. In a crisis, our health system will be dramatically stressed 
but it is already working hard every day saving lives. The offensive system of overseas 
preemption is already stressing some of our National Guard and Reserve units and yet 
Homeland Security will have to place even greater responsibility on these organizations.”  
Gingrich praised the House and Senate for establishing the appropriations 
subcommittees, but went on to argue for a permanent standing committee on Homeland 
Security.  He also urged establishment of a subcommittee of the Budget Committee 
focused on Homeland Security, saying, “This issue is such a matter of life and death that 
the Budget Committee should ensure it has adequate resources for Homeland Security 
before considering any other budgetary matters.”  
 
Gingrich concluded by observing that it would be absurd to say that Secretary Ridge has 
to report to 88 committees, “yet technically that is the present situation. So Congress 
should -in public- respond to the nation and explain exactly what it expects of the 
executive branch by organizing itself in a way so the executive branch can have an 
effective relationship with Congress.” History gives grounds for optimism that Congress 
can make the organizational changes needed to grapple with the challenge of overseeing 
homeland security. In merging the Naval and War Committees into unified Arms 
Services Committees after World War II and in creating the Budget and Intelligence 
Committees in the mid-1970s, members overcame their innate inertia and put their policy 




IV. PPB and Incrementalism 
 
Budgets supply the wherewithal to carry out programs. They may be prepared in various 
ways relying on line-item or object of expenditure format or in program or performance 
formats. These different techniques favor different products. A PPB system favors 
extended planning to respond to future situations, e.g. a threat or a plan to put a man on 
the moon. Observers of budgetary behavior, the actual outcome of the budget process, 
have made a strong case that budget outcomes tend to be incremental, that is a marginal 
increase over the current year’s base. In this section we discuss why incremental year to 
year budgeting based on caseload and performance statistics is not good enough for 
homeland security concerns and why PPB is a better system. To do this we explain the 
defense PPB system and explore PPBES in its current iteration under Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld. First let us deal with incrementalism, the "what is" of budgeting, rather than 
what should be. 
 
Incrementalism includes a reliance on the budget base and a focus on the increment of 
change. The base is what was enacted last year and what may be expected to be reenacted 
with little difficulty. The focus of effort in this process is the increment of change. In this 
incremental world, the budget process remains one where agencies ask and reviewers cut 
and the best predictor of next year’s budget is last year’s (Wildavsky, 1988:13). This 
means that the process is stable and outcomes are fairly predictable and in the aggregate 
certain percentage outcomes can be anticipated. In Wildavsky’s original study, more than 
half of the increases were within 10% of the base (Wildavsky, 1964:14) and Leloup and 
Moreland found an average outcome year over year of 11% for the Department of 
Agriculture over 25 years of observations. Precisely what number should be considered 
incremental has been debated with different authors calling different increases 
incremental (Bailey and O’Conner 1975) and research into individual agency patterns has 
shown great variation (Natchez and Bupp 1973); for example, LeLoup and Moreland 
(1978) found some agencies asked for more than a 100% increase while others asked for 
less than they had had the previous year.  
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Meyers (1994: 4) charges that incrementalism mischaracterizes present day budget 
strategies in almost every respect; for Meyers the budget process features actors who 
often make complex, rather than simple, calculations about budget decisions and roles 
that are unstable rather than clearly defined by institutional position(for example, 
reviewers do not always cut). After examining the Farmers Home Administration 
spending patterns, Meyers concludes that appropriations, budget authority and outlays 
were not good measures of how much money FmHA received or spent (Meyers, 1994: 
37). For example, Meyers notes, “From the Johnson to the Carter administration, RHIF 
(The Rural Housing Insurance Fund) obligated increasing amounts on program activities 
without corresponding increases in outlays, budget authority or appropriation” (Meyers, 
1994:31). Most of this was financed by borrowing from the treasury and from the public 
directly. Meyers argues for a brand of incrementalism based on a more sophisticated 
knowledge of budget structure. 
 
Allen Schick (Coogan et al, 1994: 4) also argues for the study of micro-budgeting, 
emphasizing that totals must be understood in terms of the parts upon which they are 
built. Totals (total revenue, total spending, and the deficit or surplus) remain significant 
as a quick scorecard, but the real work of analysis rests in the details of the budgets. 
Schick suggested that deficit control would be effective only when the budget’s totals 
were understood in terms of the parts on which they were built: managing the totals 
meant tracking and managing the parts (Coogan et al, 1994: 6).  Meyers and Schick push 
the frontier of incremental decision analysis into much more complicated territory and 
away from simpleminded analysis of percent change in appropriations. 
 
Incrementalism, for Wildavsky, was also a decision strategy; budget review would be 
parceled out and experts would review their parts, examining intensely the items of 
change. This allowed for focusing of time and analytic skills and avoided comprehensive 
calculation and conflict over major priority shifts. Here, too, research into actual 
procedures has indicated a more complex pattern where reviewers do examine the base 
(Kamlet and Mowery 1980, Gist 1977, Lauth 1987), but the concept of base and 
increment of change remains a powerful summarizing tool for characterization of the 
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budget process. To work, incremental decision making relies on feedback mechanisms to 
evaluate when a ‘bad’ decision has been made, and assumes corrective action can be 
taken. When entitlements take up budget space in the current year and, with the current 
services budget and baselines, in the future, the concept of feedback and correction is 
attenuated. Nevertheless, despite its flaws, no concept has replaced incrementalism as an 
organizing concept for understanding the budget process. 
 
While there are legal foundations to the budget process there are also informal budget 
patterns that are relatively stable and may be documented over time.  For example, at the 
U. S. national level, agencies appeared to be advocates who ask for more and reviewers 
in the parent Department, OMB and Congress tend to cut those requests. The period from 
the end of World War II until the early 1970s is sometimes referred to as the classic 
period in American budgeting. There was a recognizable budget process and conflict over 
the budget among budget process participants was diminished by informal 
understandings between participants. These ‘informal understandings’ included a 
balanced budget norm, even though budgets were never balanced and usually in a small 
deficit position. There was agreement on the general outline of public policy. The 
economic climate exhibited sustained growth and this growth resulted in growing budgets 
and the sense that government could and should attack and solve many of society’s 
problems. This ethos was particularly strong during the early 1960s. Thus budgetary 
growth became part of the political culture; budget claimants assumed that the next 
budget would be larger than the current budget and that the focus of budget discussion 
would be on the increment of change, not the absolute size of the budget, nor on a 
complete and thorough review of every program starting from zero.  
 
Theorists argued that it was rational to analyze budgets in increments and not rational to 
attempt to do comprehensive analysis of the total budget in each cycle; they argued that 
aggrieved parties would announce when something was done wrong and that this could 
be fixed either in the next budget process or by amendments to the current budget. In the 
main, the budget was made by experts, and most of budgeting was done in various 
venues in agencies, in the parent departments, in committees and sub-committees in 
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Congress, all out of the public spotlight. Some observers argued that since budgets cast 
up decisions as just a matter of dollars, and not fundamental principals, compromise was 
easier to achieve and the result was generally a stable and predictable budget process. 
 
V. Incrementalism and GPRA 
 
While Incrementalism may describe outcomes, it only partially describes how 
departments develop their budget submissions. In the federal government, departments 
may choose a variety of means to develop budgets for OMB and Congress, but they must 
play within the framework of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1992 and 
the Chief Financial Officer Act of 1990. In assessing the potential impact of the CFO Act 
and GPRA and the other laws noted, the intent is that in the future budget numbers will 
accurately relate to audited statements of government assets and liabilities. Better 
information should indicate to decision makers where to focus additional efforts to 
improve financial management. Better financial management also is intended to lead to 
more informed public policy decisions. GPRA added strategic planning to federal 
budgeting and with it OMB’s intention to hold federal agencies accountable for 
developing performance measures that would show progress toward achieving these 
strategic plans. 
 
This is a difficult task, and many observers felt that GPRA would just fade away as have so 
many other well-intentioned federal reforms (ZBB, MBO). This has not happened. In 
assessing the longevity of GPRA reform, OMB Controller Joshua Gotbaum noted that those 
who thought GPRA would simply fade away were wrong. Moreover, said Gotbaum, “…we 
have accomplished much. Almost a hundred Federal agencies developed strategic plans. 
They followed up with three sets of annual performance plans and this past spring (2000) 
completed the first-ever set of annual performance reports (Gotbaum 2000).” He claimed 
that many agencies did an excellent job of developing useful, informative FY 1999 
performance reports and mentioned two in particular.  
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First, the Department of Transportation linked program decisions to results by linking its 
various air, rail and highway programs to department wide objectives such as safety, 
economic growth and mobility. They then tracked performance by these measures, which 
Gotbaum, suggested were heavily oriented toward outcomes (i.e., reduction in 
transportation related fatalities and injuries), rather than intermediate measures of 
program performance or output measures. Gotbaum suggested that DOT was clearly 
using strategic planning and performance management to steer programs and set 
priorities. And when it needed to redirect its efforts, or shift priorities, it did so, using 
these tools. Gotbaum also praised the Department of Education for working hard to 
develop measures of effectiveness and for being honest about the measures' limitations. 
Many Education programs involve grants that operate by funding the work of non-profits, 
states and local governments. While Education keeps track of the ultimate outcomes (e.g., 
nationwide literacy), they also recognize that these are affected by many factors beyond 
the particular grant program. Gotbaum noted that many federal agencies face this 
challenge.  
 
In 1996, the General Accounting Office (GAO) warned that the issues associated with 
implementing GPRA were highly complex. First, as noted earlier, unclear goals and 
missions have hampered the targeting of program resources and caused overlap and 
duplication. Secondly, agencies often do not quickly and easily shift their focus in response 
to consumer demand and congressional directives because major changes in services and 
processes are required. Further, outcomes are difficult to define and measure. However, 
GPRA provides a mechanism for assessing agency mission and program while downsizing 
and increasing efficiency, at least in theory. More federal agencies are recognizing the 
benefits of focusing on outcomes rather than activities or outputs to improve program 
efficiency and effectiveness However, we may note that Australia has never attempted to 
measure outcomes because the task is too difficult from the perspective of the Department 
of Finance, and New Zealand, which initially led the charge to measure outcomes began to 
shift back to outputs in 2001 for the same reason.  
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GAO also warned that strong and sustained congressional attention was needed to ensure 
GPRA success. According to GAO, Congress needed to hold periodic, comprehensive 
oversight hearings and to gather information on measurement of outcomes. Congressional 
leadership was urged to determine how GPRA performance goals and information drive 
daily operations, how agencies use performance information to improve their effectiveness, 
to review progress in improving financial and information systems and staff training and 
recruitment, and to pay attention to how agencies are aligning their core business processes 
to support mission-related outcomes (GAO, 1996: Managing for Results).  
 
In summary, beyond CFOA and GMRA, with the passage of GPRA, the financial 
management reform mandate has grown to encompass a much more ambitious set of goals. 
As Congressman Dick Armey put it in July, 2000: 
The Results Act we passed eight years ago recognizes that government must 
be held accountable. Used properly, the Results Act is a powerful tool by 
which agencies can measure their performance and root out the waste, fraud 
and abuse of taxpayers' money.  …our federal government exists for the 
people. Federal agencies are and should be expected to spend tax dollars 
efficiently and to implement the laws Congress passes as they are intended--
to achieve results. [However] The most brilliant laws can fail to make 
America a better place when the execution is mishandled (Armey 2000).  
 
Review of CFO and GPRA and their associated vehicles as of 2001 suggests that steady 
progress is being made, albeit slowly. GPRA seemed to have attained a higher level of 
visibility with its broad bipartisan support, its emphasis on government accountability and 
performance and its focus on the actual results of government actions, outcomes rather than 
outputs. Its insistence on the requirement that agency results be integrated into the budget 
process makes it rare among governmental reforms as does the fact that much of it has been 
carried out in a climate of downsizing, reinvention (another code word for downsizing), and 
privatization of government functions. Moreover, GPRA is law; unlike other reforms that 
were the whim of one administration or another (Carter and zero based budgeting; Nixon 
and management by objectives), GPRA has statutory underpinnings for its performance 
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measurement requirements. Moreover GPRA has been marked with the steady deployment 
of a more and more complex set of apparatus, with the Strategic Plans due September of 
1997, Performance Plans in 1998 submitted with each budget and revised to reflect actions 
in the President’s budget and the Performance Reports first due in March 2000 and annually 
thereafter. This steady cascade of key implementation measures would give the appearance 
that progress was being made even if it were not. Let there be no mistake, progress is being 
made and progress of an impressive nature. Documents posted on the Internet trace this 
progress. A compilation of Better Features of Annual Performance Plans for FY99 cites the 
following: 
Exhibit 1: Better Features of FY1999 GPRA Implementation Plans 
Department of Agriculture 
Agricultural Research Service-Aggregate display of total funding by goal by program 
activity 
Animal Plant Health Inspection Service-Presentation of related performance information at 
different levels of detail from general goal to annual workload indicators 
Agricultural Research Service-Specific performance goals for research over a multi-year 
period. 
Agency for International Development 
Presentation of outcome goals 
Commerce 
Performance goals presented in a multi-year array; several performance indicators for each 
goal. Performance goals linked to strategic goals and objectives. 
Table of cross-cutting programs and activities grouped by agency, and cross-walked by 
Department of Commerce component and activity 
Education 
Integrated presentation for an objective distinguishing between budgetary and non-
budgetary strategies 
Environmental Protection Agency 
Display of resources by appropriation account for each objective; resources displayed are 
specific to the objective since appropriations fund more than one objective. 
Health and Human Services 
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Office of Child Support- Performance goals for a state-administered program with brief 
description of the use and value of the measure; Description of means and strategies. 
Office of Refugee Resettlement- Performance goals (including outcome goals) for a 
program administered by states and voluntary agencies. Description of external factors that 
could effect achievement of the performance goals. 
 
Interior 
Cascade of strategic goal, strategic objective and annual goals 
Labor 
Crosswalk of Strategic Goal Area by Congressional Committee 
National Science Foundation 
Descriptive statement of a successful program and a minimally effective program. 
Transportation 
Cascade of goals from Department-wide to component to grouping by strategic  goal area. 
Integration of information by goal 
Prevalence of Outcome goals 
Description of means and strategies 
Cross-cutting strategies 
Treasury 
Tabular array containing actual performance levels for Fy95-97, planned performance levels 
for FY97; estimated levels for FY98; projected levels for FY99. 
 
Veterans Affairs 
Crosswalk by agency, illustrating scope of cross-cutting VA activities and programs.  
   
Other features were cited, but this list of best practices illustrates the complexity of the effort 
to comply with GPRA as well as the progress being made. 
 
The FY2000 plans were critiqued in a series of letters sent to the 24 major federal 
departments and agencies in August of 1999 by Senator Fred Thompson, 
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Chairman of the Senate Government Governmental Affairs Committee  which has 
major oversight responsibilities for GPRA. These letters were based on committee 
staff work and GAO evaluations of each FY2000 GPRA implementation plan. In 
general, Thompson praised each agency for the progress it had made over the last 
year and identified the most important work to be done in implementing its 
FY2000 plan.  Most agencies were characterized in the letters as having made 
moderate improvements from the previous year. The Department of Education is 
a typical example. It was praised for making moderate improvement in addressing 
the weaknesses of the FY1999 GPRA implementation plan. The major strengths 
of the FY2000 plan were cited as “(1) its performance objectives and indicators 
are generally objective and measurable; (2) it includes baseline or trend data for 
most performance indicators; (3) it discusses the role of external factors on the 
Department’s ability to achieve its objectives; (4) it describes the limitations of its 
data and measures to verify the reliability of performance measures; (5) it 
describes specific validation and verification efforts; and (6) it shows how 
evaluations will be used to mitigate performance measurement shortcomings. “ 
GAO found that the Department of Education FY 2000 implementation plan had 
four key weaknesses: “ (1) some performance measures do not sufficiently cover 
key aspects of performance; (2) it does not discuss coordination of specific 
programs with similar programs in other agencies; (3) it does not include separate 
discussions of how capital assets, mission critical management systems, or human 
capital will support achievement of program results; and (4) it does not indicate 
how some data limitations will be resolved.” 
Thompson  concluded by saying that overall GAO had found Education’s plan to be 
among the more useful of the 24 agencies included in the GAO evaluation and closed by 
commending the Secretary and his staff. In general, this was how most of the letters 
unrolled.  
 
USAID was urged to develop “ clearer linkage between broad development goals and 
specific USAID country program goals and results."  USDA  strengths were that it used 
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goals and measures that addressed program results and performance; used intermediate 
outputs to show progress toward intended results, and explained how proposed capital 
assets and management systems supported achievement of program results. However, 
GAO found that the Agriculture FY 2000 plan had three key weaknesses: it did not 
consistently include strategies for mitigating external factors; it did not adequately 
describe efforts to verify and validate data; and it did not consistently discuss the impact 
of data limitations.  The Department of Commerce was criticized for the absence of 
complementary performance goals and measures for the many crosscutting programs and 
activities in which Commerce shared responsibility with other federal agencies. 
Thompson warned that this shortcoming was particularly serious in view of the fact that 
Commerce was essentially a "holding company" composed of numerous disparate 
missions, programs, and activities. Thompson also warned that performance goals for 
management problems should be included in the performance plan. Moreover, Thompson 
noted, Commerce’s FY2000 performance plan addressed only two of the ten high risk 
problem areas identified in the Department by GAO and the Department’s Inspector 
General. 
 
Of DOD, Thompson wrote that that he continued to be concerned with the financial 
management problems that continued to plague the Department: “Weaknesses in DOD’s 
financial management operations continue to hinder its ability to effectively manage its 
$250 billion budget and $1 trillion in assets. GAO wrote recently that "DOD’s Biennial 
Financial Management Improvement Plan lacks critical elements necessary for producing 
sustainable financial management improvement over the long term. Specifically, the 
Plan's discussion of how DOD's financial management operations will work in the future-
-its concept of operations--does not address: how its financial management operations 
will effectively support not only financial reporting but also asset accountability and 
control; and budget formulation." Thompson noted that this was one of approximately 50 
open GAO recommendations made to improve the credibility of DOD’s financial 
reporting and financial statement preparation.”4 Thompson then enclosed a number of 
                                                 
4 The data from this section is taken from a series of letters from Sen. Thompson, Chairman, Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee, August, 1999. 
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recommendations made by the Inspector General and GAO. In sum, the tone of these 
letters was positive and it was clear that significant improvements had been made and 
more could be expected. It was also clear that significant problems remained, for all 
agencies as they attempted to envision concrete ways to affect outcomes and particularly 
for those agencies with complex missions. 
 
VI. Criticism of GPRA 
 
Criticism of GPRA has focused on the complexity of its mission, credibility of the data 
produced, and its focus.5 GAO has pointed out that performance measures chosen by 
agencies do not meet Congressional needs for oversight data and that agencies have 
problems producing credible performance data. These two points were eminently 
predictable from the start of GPRA.  What was perhaps not as easily foreseen was the 
complexity of government and the grandiosity of the GPRA intent. GAO has noted that 
virtually all government results are produced by two or more agencies and, as a 
consequence, mission fragmentation and overlap are widespread and cross-cutting programs 
are poorly coordinated, resulting in wasted dollars, customers who are confused and 
frustrated and the undermining of overall effectiveness. The best features list above shows 
the attention paid to cross-cutting goal identification, both those that exist within 
Departments but between or among agencies, and between and among Departments. 
Unfortunately identifying cross-cutting goals does not mean that problems of coordination 
and focus and unity of effort are solved. GAO further notes that many state goals are outside 
the control of Agencies, Departments and even government. For example, those agencies 
that would improve the economy or the environment or an ecosystem, do not really have the 
capability to do so. They may have some impact on those targets, but events totally 
                                                 
5 Recent GAO reports evaluating GPRA include: Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency 
Coordination, GGD-00-106, Mar. 29, 2000 (23pages); Managing for Results: Challenges Agencies 
Face in Producing Credible Performance Information, GGD-00-52, Feb. 4, 2000 (19 pages); Managing 
for Results: Views on Ensuring the Usefulness of Agency Performance Information to Congress, 
GGD-00-35, Jan. 26,2000 (35 pages); Managing for Results: Measuring Program Results that are 
Under Limited Federal Control, GGD-99-16, Dec. 11, 1998 (24 pages); Managing for Results: 
Opportunities for Continued Improvements in Agencies' Performance Plans, GGD/AIMD-99-215, 
July 20, 1999 (124 pages) Managing for Results: Analytic Challenges in Measuring Performance, 
HEHS/GGD-97-138, May 30, 1997 (44 pages)  
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unrelated and outside the control of the agencies may dilute, reverse or overturn their efforts.  
The attempt to specify outcomes - the move to some desirable end state -- may always risk 
setting up a goal that is not realistically attainable solely through government action. Yet to 
stop at output measures is inherently self-defeating. GPRA may be used as a cost-cutting 
measure as it encourages government to operate more efficiently, but it is inherently very 
optimistic in its specification of outcomes that improve government and the life of the 
governed. Perhaps the bottom-line is that outcomes must be plausibly seen to be impacted 
favorably by government action. In this sense a carefully crafted statement is far superior to 
an exaggerated statement of what might happen in the sense that to reduce the effect of evil 
is plausible when ridding the world of evil is not plausible and only calls into question the 
amount of resources used to pursue an unobtainable goal. 
 
The structure of American government also poses a problem for GPRA. Very few public 
service provision functions are performed by the federal government alone. Even defense 
relies on state level components like the National Guard or cooperation from private sector 
contractors to produce weapons systems at acceptable prices. For agencies who pass money 
through to states and local governments in grants and aids or who pay non-profit 
corporations for health or welfare delivery services the problem of cross-cutting complexity 
and goal specification and attainment are equally difficulty. Block grant agencies that pass 
money to states have problems specifying outcomes because they can not bind states to 
pursuing those outcomes; states may have other items on their agenda than federal goals. 
Following a 1999 survey, OMBwatch said that GPRA is being taken seriously by the federal 
government, but that its influence over federal agencies and programs was small at that 
time; however “GPRA coordinators believe its influence will grow.”6  
 
OMBwatch suggested that GPRA’s influence over non-profits may likewise grow, although 
the rate of growth will be slow because of the layers of state and local governments lying 
between federal, state, and local governments and many non-profit service delivery 
agencies. OMBwatch observed that the non-profit community was only dimly aware of 
GPRA and that federal agencies whose money ultimately went to non-profits were similarly 
 29
unaware of non-profits. OMBwatch warned that this would be a problem for goal setting 
and for goal achievement, for measures that are not correctly chosen can end promoting 
outcomes that are undesirable.  OMBwatch advocated more non-profit interest and 
involvement in GPRA by non-profits and a reaching out to all stakeholders by those 
implementing the law at the federal level, including both Congress and the executive branch 
agencies. In 2000, Ellen Taylor of OMBwatch observed that GPRA success still depends on 
government’s commitment to it and that there was considerable uncertainty about whether 
GPRA was working.  
 Taylor observed that there was not a lot of public awareness of GPRA. She warned 
that GPRA should not be used as a partisan tool, e. g. by either the executive or Congress to 
attempt to score political points off the other, and concluded that performance was not the 
whole story. She noted that surveys had found that satisfaction with specific government 
services was rising measurably and nearly on a par with the private sector, but that trust in 
government had only slightly increased and remained low, still not rising to the level of trust 
obtained in surveys taken in 1988. In her testimony she urged Congress to focus on 
successes in government and on the way its services are improving, rather than to maintain a 
focus on failures (Taylor 2000). She also urged that public access to information used to 
develop performance measures be improved and suggested that public knowledge in itself 
may lead to corrective measures. As a case in point, she observed:” Although EPA never 
identified specific amounts of reduction in emission of toxic chemicals, the public 
accessibility of the Toxics Release Inventory helped create a 45% decline in the release of 
those chemicals.”  This again suggests the great optimism which underlies GPRA efforts, 
reminiscent of the ‘If you build it, they will come,’ line from the movie Field Of Dreams, 
only with GPRA the premise is ‘…give them the right information and they will do the right 
thing.’ At this point the reader might want to consider theorists who perceived the world in 
darker hues -- Hobbes, for example - and suggest that much of government has to do with 




                                                                                                                                                 
6 OMBWATCH GPRA Study. 1999 
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 VII. Congress and Crosscutting Program Problems. 
 
Cross-cutting programs pose a special problem for Congress because it is not set up to 
review, fund, or exercise oversight of cross-cutting programs. Chris Mihm of GAO re-
enforces this point: 
 
Unfocused and uncoordinated crosscutting programs waste scarce 
resources, confuse and frustrate taxpayers and program beneficiaries, and 
limit overall program effectiveness. Our work in over 40 program areas 
across the government has repeatedly shown that mission fragmentation and 
program overlap are widespread, and that crosscutting federal program 
efforts are not well-coordinated. For example, we have reported on 50 
programs for the homeless that were administered by 8 federal agencies. 
Housing services were provided through 23 programs operated by 4 
agencies, and food and nutrition services were under 26 programs 
administered by 6 agencies (Mihm 2000). 
 
Mihm argued that the government-wide performance plan and the agencies' annual 
performance plans and subsequent performance reports should provide Congress with 
information on agencies and programs addressing similar results. Once these programs 
have been identified, then Congress can consider the associated policy, management, and 
performance implications of crosscutting programs as part of its oversight over the 
executive branch. Mihm notes that this will present challenges to the traditional 
committee structures and processes and observes that Congress has no direct mechanism 
to use in providing a Congressional perspective to the President’s government-wide 
performance plan or to agency goals, missions and alternatives, particularly for mission 
areas and programs that cut across committee jurisdictions. It seems that the logical 
outcome of oversight of GPRA efforts will have to change the structure of Congress, 
itself, an effort not lightly undertaken or easily accomplished. It is obvious that cross-
cutting programs are a first order program for homeland security. Thus while it could 
operate in an incremental, line-item world, developing strategic plans to make the world 
5% or 10% safer for democracy each year, this is not good enough. This has been 
recognized within DHS and the Department has turned to its own PPB system. To 
understand why this is important, we now turn to an appreciation of PPB as it has 
evolved in DOD. 
 
 31
VIII. History of PPB 
 
Budgetary outcomes tend to be incremental irrespective of whether they are produced by 
object of expenditure systems, performance budgets, or PPB systems. Why bother then 
with what system should be used. The answer is quite simple. Systems which rely on 
simple measures of what was consumed and base the next year’s budget on where 
shortages were risk going slowly astray from where they should be, by a budgetary 
increment each year as they focus on how well they did things in the past. In a PPB 
system, some future scenario drives the plan and the plan leads to the budget. The budget 
buys the current year of the plan. PPB always looks forward. Defense PPB looks at the 
threat and what needs to be done to meet the threat five to ten years in the future. 
Figuring out the future is hard and budgeting to meet events that might not happen is 
risky. The first iteration of PPB in the 1960’s had the cachet systems thinking, 
cybernetics, information processing, and benefit cost analysis. It promised a lot, but it 
was a passing fad in federal civilian agencies, instituted for only a brief period in the 
1960’s.  It did not fade away in defense however. While PPBS was discontinued for the 
federal government as a whole more than 30 years ago, it continued to be employed by 
the DOD because it meets the policy development and participatory demands of multi-
service budget advocacy while also providing a long-term perspective on programs and 
spending. While DOD manages its internal resource management systems, this is done 
under the watchful eyes of Congress. Consequently, in resource planning and in budget 
preparation and execution, DOD continually searches for a greater delegation of authority 
from Congress to permit the exercise of greater managerial discretion to improve 
efficiency and respond to contingencies. Recent reforms in the form of a proposed 
Defense Transformation Act to increase such delegation were requested by DOD in 2003 
before Congress, as explained in this chapter. 
 
A number of issues related to planning and budgeting for national defense confound 
DOD and congressional decision makers annually. Among these are how to perform 
effective and competent threat assessment and the consequences of doing this job well or 
poorly. Another issue is how much to spend on national defense. This is determined in 
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large part by the perceived threat. The perception of threat also must be interpreted in the 
dynamics of the politics of budgeting for defense. Numerous variables affect public 
opinion about threat and spending. Debate and consensus building for national defense 
budgets is part of our democratic political tradition. Budgeting for national defense is 
always complicated by conflicting political opinion and information, and also the need 
for selective degrees of secrecy with respect to identifying and evaluating the threat and 
budgetary responses to it. These conditions make marketing the need for national defense 
spending an inevitable task and part of the obligation of defense advocates working in an 
open political system.  
Because so much of the policy framework and budget of the Department of Defense is 
determined by Congress, which under the U. S. Constitution has sole power to tax and 
spend, analysis of resource allocation for defense cannot ignore the political context 
within which decisions are made and executed. Policy development and resource 
planning for defense is inextricably linked to constituent politics in defense budgeting. 
National security policy choice and implementation is made more difficult by the highly 
pluralistic nature of the resource allocation decision environment (Wildavsky 1988: 191-
193; Adelman and Augustine, 1990). Still, disagreements over policy and resource 
allocation should be anticipated and, indeed, welcomed in a democracy. 
Policy development, planning, and resource-allocation decision making for the U. S. 
Department of Defense is a task of enormous complexity due to the nature and size of the 
Defense Department and the highly differentiated nature of its mission and activities. The 
Department of Defense plans, prepares, negotiates, and makes decisions on policy, 
programs, and resource allocation using the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 
System. 
PPBS was implemented in DOD originally by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and 
by Charles Hitch, Robert Anthony, and others during the administrations of Presidents 
Kennedy and Johnson in the 1960s (Thompson and Jones, 1994). Prior to 1962, the DOD 
did not have a top-down coordinated approach for planning and budgeting (Puritano, 
1981; Korb, 1977; Korb, 1979; Joint DoD/GAO Working Group on PPBS, 1983). Until 
this time, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) had played a limited role in budget review 
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as each military service developed and defended its own budget. McNamara had used 
PPBS when he was the President of the Ford Motors Corporation. He and Charles Hitch, 
his Comptroller, had confidence that the system would be valuable for long-range 
resource planning and allocation in DOD. McNamara wanted PPBS to become the 
primary resource decision and allocation mechanism used by the DOD. McNamara 
implemented the system after President John F. Kennedy tasked him to establish tighter 
control by the Secretary of Defense, a civilian, over the military departments and 
services. As a former member of Congress, Kennedy was highly distrustful of the 
military service planning and budgeting. He ordered McNamara to take control of DOD 
planning and budgeting away from the military and put it in the hands of civilian 
leadership. Consequently, the initial motivation for establishing PPBS had as much to do 
with control and politics as it did with rational resource planning and budgeting. By June 
30, 1964, PPB was operational within the Department of Defense (Thompson and Jones, 
1994; Feltes, 1976; Korb, 1977; Korb, 1979). 
 
Hitch implemented PPBS and systems analysis throughout DOD, but most of the 
program analysis was done by his “whiz kids” in the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) under the Comptroller and the office of Program Analysis and Evaluation. The 
military departments were not anxious to implement PPBS, but had to do so eventually to 
play in the new planning and budgeting game run and orchestrated by Hitch and his staff. 
After a few years, the military departments were fully engaged in learning how to 
compete in the new PPBS process. However, as noted, PPBS was not just budget reform 
– it was a new approach to analysis and competition between alternative programs, 
weapons systems and, ultimately, multi-year programmatic objectives. Additional 
reforms beyond PPBS were to be proposed by DOD under the Johnson administration. 
 
Charles Hitch was followed as DOD Comptroller by Robert N. Anthony, a professor of 
management control on loan from Harvard University’s School of Business, who 
proposed an ambitious set of changes to DOD budgeting and accounting in 1966 in what 
was termed Project Prime. Among other things, Project Prime would have divided all 
parts of DOD into mission, revenue, expense and service centers, consistent with 
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management control theory according to Anthony, and required accrual accounting with 
reimbursable fee-for-service internal transactional payments (using negotiated or shadow 
prices) throughout DOD (Thompson and Jones, 1994: 66-68). What Anthony envisioned 
was a reimbursable accounting process similar to what was implemented in much of 
DOD by Comptroller Sean O’Keefe and Deputy Comptroller Donald Shycoff as part of 
the Defense Management Report initiatives of 1989-1992 under the Bush administration 
and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney (Jones and Bixler, 1992).  Project Prime also 
included accrual accounting and budgeting for DOD. Accrual accounting is required now 
under the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, which DOD has been unable to 
implement successfully. Clearly, Anthony was ahead of his time in his vision of how 
DOD accounting and budgeting should be organized (Thompson and Jones, 1994: 67-
68).  
 
Congress did not support Anthony’s proposed changes. Key members of the 
appropriations committees refused to allow the change to accrual accounting and rejected 
Project Prime, probably because they thought it would reduce their leverage to 
micromanage DOD through the budget. Opposition was so strong that it was suggested 
Anthony should be asked to resign. Anthony was not asked to do so, but chose to return 
to Harvard and the experiment was ended (Jones, 2001b). Not until 2003 did DOD return 
to Congress with such a sweeping reform proposal – the Defense Transformation Act.  
 
The post-WWII sequence of budget reforms that led to PPBS in the 1960s started with 
performance budgeting in the 1950s. In essence, performance budgeting (Burkhead, 
1959: chapters 6-7, and 133-181) attempts to connect inputs to outputs. As implemented 
by the President’s Bureau of the Budget (BOB) under the Eisenhower administration, 
performance budgeting (PB) in the 1950s was characterized by indicators of cost per unit 
of work accomplished, focusing on workload measures rather than outputs or outcomes. 
The history of performance budgeting includes the Taft Commission of 1912 which 
recommended it be implemented and its implementation in the Department of Agriculture 
in 1934 and the Tennessee Valley Authority in the later 1930s, as well as having been 
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strongly recommended by the Hoover Commission in 1949 (McCaffery and Jones, 2001: 
69).  
 
In 1949, Congress required that the budget estimates of the Department of Defense be 
presented in performance categories. Performance budgeting was an executive branch 
managerial budget tool. During the 1950s under the leadership of Bureau of the Budget 
Director Maurice Stans and others, executive budgeting was transformed somewhat 
radically through the institution of performance measures into budgets. Many of the 
measures had already been in use for decades as proxies that facilitated and simplified 
negotiations between the Executive and Congress. However, in this first wave of 
performance budgeting (the second wave would hit in the 1990s) great effort was exerted 
to develop measures of performance and relate these to appropriations and spending. In 
fact, many of the measures developed in this era did not measure performance. Instead, 
because it was easier (and perhaps the only approach possible), workload and input cost 
data were used in place of real measures of performance. Still, budgeting in this era 
moved far from the simple line-item formats of the past. Formulae and ratios between 
proposed spending and actions were integrated into the Executive budget along with 
explanations of what the measures demonstrated and how they related to justifications for 
additional resources. (McCaffery and Jones, 2001: 69) 
 
The emphasis of budget reform shifted in the early 1960s to what was termed “program 
budgeting.” Program budgeting (Mosher, 1954; Novick, 1969) was and is a variation of 
or evolution from performance budgeting in which information is collected by program 
categories, without much of the detail of the performance-budget construction. These 
categories of spending are tied to specific objectives to be achieved. Activities are 
grouped by department, agency, and then by mission objective and sometimes by 
function and projected for a five-year period. Program budgeting was experimented with 
in the Department of Agriculture in the early 1960s as reported by Wildavsky and 
Hammond (Wildavsky and Hammond, 1965) and later adopted throughout the entire 
federal government through Executive Order by President Lyndon Johnson in 1966.  
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The Programming, Planning, Budgeting System (Lee and Johnson, 1983: chapter five; 
Hinricks and Taylor, 1969; Merewitz and Sosnick, 1972; Schick, 1966; Schick, 1973; 
McCaffery and Jones, 2001: 70) was intended to be a thorough analysis and planning 
system that incorporated multiple sets of plans and programs. Under Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara and DOD Comptroller Charles Hitch, PPBS drew upon methods from 
various disciplines, including economics, systems analysis, strategic planning, 
cybernetics, and public administration to array and analyze alternative means and goals 
by program and then derive benefit/cost ratios intended to indicate which means and ends 
to choose. Budgeting under this system was to become a simple matter of costing out the 
goal chosen.  
 
In theory, the program budgets that resulted from PPBS were supposed to provide the 
Executive and Congress information on what the federal government was spending for 
particular categories, e.g., health, education, public safety, etc. across all departments and 
agencies. Program budgets may best be understood as matricies with program categories 
on one axis and departments on the other. Thus, in the fully articulated program budget 
Congress could determine how much was spent on health or education in total in all 
departments and agencies and this would promote deliberation over whether this was 
enough, too much or too little.  
 
President Lyndon Johnson thought that PPBS was so successful in DOD that in 1966 he 
issued an executive order to have it implemented throughout the federal government. 
Regrettably, although Executive branch departments prepared their program budgets and 
related spending to objectives, Congress largely ignored what it was presented, preferring 
to stick with the traditional appropriations framework for analysis and enactment of the 
budget. (Schick, 1973) Why was this the case? Perhaps program budgets presented too 
much information to be used and understood by Congress. Alternatively, and as likely, 
perhaps Congress perceived that program budgeting would reduce the power of members 
of appropriations committees because the budget in this format would be determined too 
much by formula, thus decreasing the political spending discretion of Congress (Jones 
and Bixler, 1992). Although the government-wide experiment with PPBS was suspended 
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by President Richard Nixon in 1969, this was done more for political than efficiency 
reasons. However, PPBS was perceived in much of the Executive branch and Congress as 
paper-heavy and consuming too much staff time for preparation and analysis (Schick, 
1973). Still, the system continued to be used in the Department of Defense, in part 
because DOD purchases substantial long-lived capital assets and since PPB requires 
long-range planning as its first component, it suited the needs of the Defense Department.  
 
Thus, despite criticism that PPBS was a failure in the federal government, the process 
remained in use by the DOD and has been modified incrementally so as to operate 
effectively despite some evident flaws (Wildavsky 1988: 186-202; Puritano, 1981, 
McCaffery and Jones, 2001). While the manner in which PPBS operates has varied under 
different Presidents and Secretaries of Defense, the basic characteristics of the system 
have remained in place for more than 40 years. During this period, three significant 
reform initiatives have influenced the PPB system: the Laird reforms, the Goldwater-
Nichols Act, and the Rumsfeld transformation in 2001-2003. 
 
Laird Reforms 
In 1969, Melvin Laird was appointed Secretary of Defense by President-elect Richard 
Nixon to succeed McNamara. Laird brought a different management orientation to the 
Defense Department, one more in keeping with its historical predilections, emphasizing 
decentralization and military service primacy. If McNamara increased scientific decision 
making in the Pentagon, he also installed a centralized management approach. Systems 
analysis, top-down planning, and benefit/cost analysis supported this centralized focus. 
One of the key bureaucratic players was the Office of Policy Analysis, which made use of 
the tools cited above to help McNamara centralize decisions in the Office of Secretary of 
Defense (Thompson and Jones, 1994: 68-73). Laird’s methods ran counter to this 
approach, emphasizing participatory management and decentralization of power. 
Beginning in 1969, Laird shifted decision making power away from the DOD staff 
agencies to the Military Department Secretaries, because there were, “…many decisions 
that should be made by the Services Secretaries and they should have the responsibility 
for running their own programs. I have no business being involved in how many 20mm 
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guns should go on a destroyer. That is the Secretary of the Navy's business. I must let the 
Services take a greater role.” (Feltes, 1976) Laird also pursued a process of participatory 
management, in which he hoped to gain the cooperation of the military leadership in 
reducing the defense budget and the size of the forces.  
 
During Laird’s four-year tenure, U. S. troop strength in Vietnam fell from 549,500 
persons in 1969 to 69,000 in May of 1972 (Laird, 2003). Laird was preoccupied with 
disengaging from Vietnam, but not to the exclusion of other issues, such as burden-
sharing costs with other nations, maintaining technological superiority (e.g., B-1 bomber, 
Trident submarine), improved procurement, enhanced operational readiness, and strategic 
sufficiency and limitations on the nuclear build-up (Feltes, 1976; Armed Forces 
Management. 1969). He ended the selective service draft in January of 1973 and was 
persistent in his efforts to secure the release of American POWs.  
 
Laird spent a lot of time preparing for and testifying in Congress and improved DOD 
relations with Congress. On the management side, Laird gave the military department 
secretaries and the JCS a more influential role in the development of budgets and force 
levels, but he also returned to the use of service program and budget ceilings (fixed 
shares) and required services to program within these ceilings. This concept of ceilings or 
“top-line” endured for most of the next 40 years and still influences DOD budget requests 
today, as services are expected to balance their program and budget against the total 
obligational authority they are given at various stages in the planning and budget process.  
 
Laird sought to provide a better balance between military and civilian judgment in the 
defense decision-making process by providing better and earlier strategic and fiscal 
guidance to the services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Feltes suggests that the result of 
Laird's emphasis on decentralized management was that responsibility for military 
planning was shifted back to the military services, and the role of OSD Systems Analysis 
was de-emphasized. While no abrupt shifts were made, the Laird era was marked by a 
steady and persistent shift away from McNamara’s emphasis on centralization of DOD 
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decision making under the Secretary of Defense (Feltes, 1976; Armed Forces 
Management. 1969). 
 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 
It may be argued that the creation of the defense department in 1947-49 never really took 
hold in that, by and large, the military departments continued to go their separate ways 
within the envelope of the Department of Defense until the reforms of the 1960s and, to 
some extent, until implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (Thompson and 
Jones, 1994: 78-79, 246). In the 1950s, Presidents Truman and Eisenhower both fought 
arguably losing battles to strengthen the role of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
the JCS (Thompson and Jones, 1994: 51-53).  
 
By 1981, the sitting JCS Chairman, USMC Gen. David Jones was writing that the system 
was broken and asking Congress to fix it (Jones, D. 1982). The fact that Gen. Jones as 
CJCS was voicing such criticisms was in itself very significant (Chiarelli, 1993:71). In 
1981, Jones (1982) suggested that because of the decentralized and fragmented resource 
allocation process driven by parochial service loyalties, there was always more program 
than budget to buy it; that the focus was always on service programs; that changes were 
always marginal when perhaps better analysis would have led to more sweeping changes; 
that it was impossible to focus on critical cross-service needs; and the result was that an 
amalgamation of service needs prevailed at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level.  
 
General Jones argued that staff to the Chairman of the JCS was so small that the 
Chairman could focus only on a few issues. The result was that the defense budget was 
driven by the desires of the services (usually for more programs and money), rather than 
by a well-integrated JCS plan. In addition, he argued that all of this undercut the authority 
of not only the JCS but the entire unified command structure established in the Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1958 (Thompson and Jones, 1994: 51-53). General Jones noted 
this was particularly evident in acquisition, where weapons systems met performance 
goals 70% of the time, but schedules 15% of the time, and cost goals 10% of the time. 
Jones explained: 
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The lack of discipline in the budget system prevents making the 
very tough choices of what to do and what not to do. Instead, 
strong constituencies in the Pentagon, Congress, and industry 
support individual programs, while the need for overall defense 
effectiveness and efficiency is not adequately addressed.” (Jones, 
1996: 27). 
 
In 1986 Congress passed a sweeping reform plan, commonly referred to as the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act (for its congressional sponsors), over the ardent objections of 
many in the Pentagon, including Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger (Locher, 1996: 
10; Locher, 2002) who thought it would break apart the DOD management system. The 
legislation is too complex to detail here, but among other things it strengthened the hand 
of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as chief military advisor and spokesman to 
the Secretary of Defense and to the President, provided the CJCS with a larger staff and 
identified important phases in the PPBS process where the JCS would play in setting 
requirements and reviewing the plans of other players. It established the national 
command authority to run from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified 
commanders in chief (CINCs). This increased their formal authority so that rather than 
using whatever forces the military services would allow them to use in their geographical 
area, the unified CINCs had war fighting and command responsibilities and the military 
service roles were to provide them with the wherewithal to do so (Thompson and Jones, 
1994: 51-53, 79, 223-224). This distinction clearly put the military services in the role of 
training people and providing personnel and equipment for the warfighting missions of 
the geographically based unified command CINC’s. Goldwater-Nichols also created the 
position of Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Generally, the officers who have 
served in this spot have been strong innovators and, through various committee 
structures, have had a substantial impact on the resource planning process within DOD.  
 
Goldwater-Nichols also emphasized the requirement for joint command officer duty 
assignment. Before Goldwater-Nichols, JCS and joint command assignments were 
viewed as almost career-ending assignments, thus many of the best officers tried to avoid 
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them. CJCS Jones observed that people serving joint tours did less well in the promotion 
process than those who had not served such tours (Jones, 1996: 28). While implementing 
it has been an evolutionary process, Goldwater-Nichols has changed this perspective – 
such assignments now may be career enhancing. The Act also required all officers to pass 
certain levels of joint proficiency and upwardly mobile officers now believe a joint tour is 
a must.  
 
Most importantly, Goldwater-Nichols changed the caliber of advice given to the 
President and Secretary of Defense by the JCS. Former CJCS Army General 
Shalikashvili praised this part of the Act, “...we have broken free from the ‘lowest 
common denominator’ recommendation that so often plagued us in the past.” (Roberts, 
1996: 1) Shalikashvili indicated there was still room for smoothing the role of the JCS in 
the planning and budgeting cycles, in the national military planning process, and in 
management of officers into joint billets. Nonetheless, it is clear that Goldwater-Nichols 
is a success, as Secretary of Defense Perry noted in 1995, “It dramatically changed the 
way that America’s forces operate by streamlining the command process and 
empowering the Chairman and the unified commanders. These changes paid off 
in....Desert Storm, in Haiti, and today in Bosnia.”(Locher, 1996:15)  
 
On the resource allocation side, Goldwater-Nichols provides two classes of organizations, 
those who do the warfighting, under the unified command CINCS, and those who support 
them, the military departments and services and their own CINCs. The military 
department secretaries hold most of the DOD budget authority, while the service CINCs 
play key roles in programming, with less leverage in budgeting. Most of the combatant 
commands, the unified CINCS, do not have their own budgets (except for their staffs). 
Rather, they use the personnel and weaponry provided them by the military departments 
and services. However, the military CINCs must pass their budget requests through the 
unified command CINCs before they move upward in the budget chain of command to 
the Pentagon. Prior to the mid-1990s this review by the unified command staffs used to 
be pro forma but it has become a real review in many unified commands, e.g., CINCPAC 
review of CINCPACFLT budget proposals. The Special Operations Forces command, 
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headquartered at McDill Air Force base in Florida, has its own sizable (and increasing) 
budget, but SOF budgets still are small compared to the military department budgets.  
 
The unified CINCs also have an opportunity to identify requirements in the PPBES 
process and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has the responsibility to advise the 
Secretary of Defense to certify the merit of these requirements as well as how well the 
budgets of the military departments satisfy the unified CINC needs. The JCS Chairman 
also can submit alternative recommendations to SECDEF to meet unified CINC needs in 
the budget. In this matter, SECDEF is the final arbiter of what the military departments 
get in their budgets. The unified and service CINCs both have opportunities to give input 
to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in the PPBES planning process for development of 
the National Military Strategy, and in the final draft of the defense guidance which leads 
to the POM process. In the POM process, the service CINCs make inputs by providing 
their Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs) that indicate their top war fighting needs (important 
information for the JCS and unified CINCs). Military service CINCs may indicate 
program deficiencies that exist and make recommendations to fix deficiencies to both the 
JCS and the military service chiefs. The IPLs are a part of the programming and 
budgeting process and are duly considered in several venues in OSD and the military 
departments. More detail on this is provided subsequently in this chapter. 
 
An unresolved tension is evident here as the unified and service CINCs both have been 
criticized as sometimes tending to focus on short-term operational needs, war fighting 
issues, and the O&M accounts that support readiness. Simultaneously, the military 
departments have to keep an eye not only on the short-term and immediate items and 
issues, but also weapons procurement and recapitalization issues, such as modernizing 
the aircraft or fleet inventory. Some players in the PPBES process believe this is a 
healthy tension. Others worry that immediate issues, and some long-term needs, may be 
slighted. DOD is currently in the middle of another significant change as Secretary 
Rumsfeld pursues his goal of transforming both military and business affairs while 
actively employing some part of the operating force in combat situations. This reform is 
somewhat of a return to a more centralized pattern of operations. 
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 IX. PPBES Today 
 
In 2003, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced significant changes to the PPB 
system, renaming it the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System or 
PPBES (Secretary of Defense, 2003a). While the basic structure of PPBS remains, it was 
changed in several important ways. First, the reform merged separate programming and 
budget review into a single review cycle, done simultaneously rather than sequentially. 
Second, it incorporated a biennial budget process matched to national electoral cycles 
with major strategic changes slated for the second and fourth year of a Presidential term 
and minimal updating change made in the first and third years. Third, it fixed timing of 
the process so that planning and budgeting were clearly derivative processes driven by 
the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Military Strategy. Fourth, it changed 
the cycle for Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) provision of the top level planning 
information to the military departments and services from annual to biennial. The result 
of these changes was to create a two-year decision cycle with a complete review in year 
one followed by limited incremental review in year two. This was meant to decrease 
turbulence and reduce unnecessary re-making of decisions. These changes made each on-
year cycle quicker by compressing the programming and budgeting cycles, but preserved 
the decisions made in the on-year cycle through the off-year by limiting reconsideration 
of decisions to only the most necessary updates. Decisions would be made more quickly, 
but last longer.  
This change in the venerable PPB system was part of but separate from Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld’s efforts to transform defense and was not part of the Defense 
Transformation Initiatives presented to Congress in 2003. None of the reforms 
implemented in 2001 through 2003 in the PPB process needed Congressional approval; 
they were internal matters concerning how DOD would organize its planning and 
budgeting process. While critics had pointed out flaws in PPB for some time, the genesis 
of this set of reforms clearly appears to rest with Secretary Rumsfeld, who felt the 
process was too slow and cumbersome and did not deliver the “right stuff” on a timely 
 44
basis. This provided the impetus to accelerate the cycle, but also to avoid unnecessary 
remaking of decisions. Implicit in this process is the idea that SECDEF and his staff will 
be brought into the decision loop more quickly, though this is not articulated in 
documents that describe the process changes.  
Each year the Secretary of Defense had issued the Defense Planning Guidance to guide 
the programming and budgeting processes with force structure directions and fiscal 
constraints. This comes after extensive analysis of world conditions, the threat situation 
and U. S. options and strategies. The Defense Planning Guidance describes SECDEF’s 
guidelines for creating force structure to meet the threat, including his appreciation of 
fiscal constraints. The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) will now become a biennial 
guidance. The Office of the Secretary of Defense will no longer provide the military 
services and defense agencies this annual classified planning document designed to help 
them develop their budget and program requests for the upcoming fiscal year. The move 
away from developing the top-level Defense Planning Guidance each year is part of the 
OSD move toward two-year budget cycles. If necessary, OSD may prepare “off-year” 
guidance documents reflecting minor strategy changes, according to Management 
Initiative Decision No. 913, issued May 22, 2003 by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz (Secretary of Defense, 2003a). The idea here is that the threat does not change 
that quickly. For example, the Cold War threat scenario lasted from about 1948 to 1990 
and was followed by a “base force and reconstitute” scenario until 2001. Thus the threat 
picture has long term salience, and complete annual reviews to it followed by a full 
budget cycle were seen as costly and inefficient. The essence of the reform places the 
biennial issuance of the DPG document in a two-year cycle within the four years that a 
Presidential administration has to develop its national defense objectives and strategy. A 
series of documents has in the past guided this process, including the annual DPG, the 
Future Years Defense Program, the issuance of each new President's national security 
strategy, and development of the Quadrennial Defense Review for use by DOD and for 
reporting to Congress. The QDR consists of a comprehensive analysis of military 
readiness, capabilities and force structure that helps to provide a reporting framework to 
permit a newly elected administration to develop its spending plan and budget.  Since the 
early 1990s, the QDR has become the primary external and one of the major internal 
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statements of policy by the Secretary of Defense. In order to explain these changes and 
how they are playing out we first examine the PPBES process and then discuss how the 
Department of Navy operated its budget process in the new PPBES process in 2002 and 
2003. 
PPBES PROCESS OVERVIEW 
The purpose of PPBES is to provide a systematic and structured approach for allocating 
resources in support of the national security strategy of the U.S.  The ultimate goal of the 
entire PPBES process is to provide the military Commander-in-Chiefs with the best mix 
of forces, equipment and support attainable within resource constraints. Before delving 
into the full complexity of PPBES it is useful to review the system in summary. Once we 
understand how PPBES operates in general, we then review changes initiated in 2001 and 
2003 to significantly modify PPBS into what is now PPBES -- the result of significant 
reforms authorized by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld under the administration of 
President George W. Bush. Then, when we understand the changes made during this 
period, we examine how the process operates in detail.  
PPBS has four distinct phases, with each phase overlapping the other phases (Jones and 
Bixler, 1992: 19-31).  
 
The planning phase begins at the Executive Branch level with the President’s National 
Security Strategy (NSS) developed by the National Security Council. The NSS takes its 
input from several federal agencies (including the Department of State, the Central 
Intelligence Agency and others in the intelligence community) to ascertain the threats to 
the U.S. in order to form the nation’s overall strategic plan to meet those threats, thereby 
outlining the national defense strategy. Subsequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
produce a fiscally unconstrained document called the National Military Strategy 
Document (NMSD). The NMSD contains their advice regarding strategic planning to 
meet the direction given in the National Security Strategy while addressing the military 
capabilities required supporting that objective.  As a follow on to the NMSD, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) advises the Secretary of Defense, in the 
Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR), regarding joint capabilities to be realized 
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across DOD military components. The CPR provides the personal recommendations of 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for promoting joint readiness, doctrine, and training, and 
better satisfying joint warfighting requirements in order to influence formulation of the 
Defense Planning Guidance. The Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR) is seen as 
a key joint staff input from the CJCS and his staff into the PPBES process. It is meant to 
help steer the Defense Planning Guidance. 
 
All of the above inputs are provided to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) for drafting 
and ultimately issuance of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), and the Future Year 
Defense Plan, a six-year projection of department-wide force structure requirements.  The 
DPG provides the military services official guidance regarding force structure and fiscal 
guidelines for use in preparing their Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) during the 
programming phase of PPBES. For purposes of reporting to Congress on defense 
planning, the DOD also prepares and transmits a comprehensive report referred to as the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In the past decade, the QDR has enhanced the 
FYDP and DPG for purposes of planning for the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) and DOD. The exhibit below shows how these planning documents lead directly 
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Woven within the POM are the Sponsor Program Proposals (SPPs) developed by 
resource sponsors (e.g., the major commands, systems commands and defense agencies) 
to address military service objectives, and preferences of the CINCs. The SPPs must be 
developed within the constraints of military component Total Obligation Authority 
(TOA), defined as the total amount of funds available for spending in a given year 
including new obligation authority and unspent funds from prior years. 
 
Military department and service POMs are reviewed by the JCS to ensure compliance 
with the NMSD and DPG, assessing force levels, balance and capabilities.  Following the 
review, the CJCS issues the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA) to influence the 
Secretary of Defense decisions delineated in the Program Decision Memoranda (PDM) 
marking the end of the programming phase. The Chairman’s Program Assessment is 
another key steering device that the Chairman uses to give his personal assessment of the 
adequacy and risks of service and defense agency POMs. He also proposes alternative 
program recommendations and budget proposals for SECDEF consideration prior to the 
issuance of Program Decision Memoranda (PDM) by SECDEF. The PDM issued by 
OSD approves or adjusts programs in each POM.  The POM that has been amended by 
the PDM provides an approved baseline for military departments to submit their budget 
inputs. While the programming phase of PPBES operated as a separate cycle from the 
1960s through the early 2000s, in August 2001 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
merged the POM and budget review cycles as is noted later. 
 
In acquisition matters, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is supported by the Joint 
Resources Oversight Committee (JROC) a committee led by the Vice Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs and composed of the service Vice-Chiefs who review all joint acquisition 
programs and programs where a joint interest in interoperability is evident. The Chairman 
then can and does make recommendations about acquisition priorities. This is another 
change rising out of Goldwater-Nichols and out of the Grenada operation where Army 
and Marine troops on the ground could not communicate with other units because the 
radios used were not interoperable. The JROC approves the mission need and conducts 
an analysis to see how well the suggested acquisition program meets these needs. The 
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process of staffing a proposal up to the JROC decision level involves assessment and 
analysis by various committees ending at the Flag level, and analytic effort by JCS staff 
and can take four to five months. A successful program that is vetted and found to meet 
joint requirements then has a priority attached to it at the JROC level and is then passed 
into the POM and later the budget for funding.  
Part of the 2003 reform was intended to accelerate and improve the acquisition process. 
In April 2002, Defense Planning Guidance study #20 (Secretary of Defense, 2002b) 
concluded that the resource requirements process frequently produced stovepiped 
systems that were not necessarily based on required capabilities and incorporated 
decisions from a single service perspective. The study found that the acquisition process 
did not necessarily develop requirements in the context of how the joint force would 
fight. Rather, requirements tended to be more service-focused. Moreover, duplication of 
efforts was apparent in the less visible and smaller acquisition programs. The study 
observed that the current culture aimed for the 100% (perfect) solution and this resulted 
in lengthy times to field weapons. In addition, the process was still found to lack 
prioritization of joint warfighting demands. Ongoing reform here resulted in reshaping of 
the JROC process so that decisions would be better set up for JROC to make its decision 
by two new oversight committees reporting to it, headed by flag officers and focused on 
functional areas. This is an on-going part of the 2003 reform and is indicative of 
Secretary Rumsfeld’s interest in joint operations, joint warfighting, and a quicker 
acquisitions process. In the exhibit above, the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP) is the 
database of record in which POM and budget actions are tracked and recorded. The 
FYDP is updated after every major process action, e.g. submittal of President’s budget, 
passage of appropriation bill, conclusion of program change proposals and budget change 
proposals. 
 
The budgeting phase begins with the approved programs in each military service POM.   
Each military component costs out the items that support its POM for the budget year and 
submits its part of the budget as its Budget Estimate Submission (BES).  The BES in 
even-numbered “POM years” is a two-year submission and is based on the first two years 
of the POM as adjusted by the PDM.  The BES’s are amended by the services during the 
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POM update occurring in odd-numbered years and cover only one year. Every BES is 
reviewed by military secretariats under the authority of the military department 
secretaries because budgeting is a civilian function in DOD, as mandated by Congress in 
the 1970s. The budgets of the military department Secretaries are then reviewed by the 
DOD Comptroller, other OSD officials, the JCS and ultimately by the Deputy and 
Secretary of Defense.  
 
The Office of the Secretary of Defense cooperates in this review with the President's 
Office of Management and Budget. This review attempts to ensure compliance with the 
DPG, the PDM and the President’s National Security Strategy.  SECDEF staff makes 
changes and provide rationale for these changes in the form of Program Budget Decisions 
(PBD). Before becoming part of the President’s Budget, required for submission to 
Congress no later than the first Monday in February, PBDs are issued to allow the 
military department secretaries and budget staff to respond with appeals of cuts 
(reclamas) to SECDEF/OSD Comptroller staff.  Once major budget issues have been 
resolved, the final defense budget is sent to OMB to become part of the President's 
Budget. This step constitutes the end of the budget proposal and review phase of PPBS. 
However, as noted subsequently, budget execution is a critical part of PPBS typically 
ignored in analysis of this system. 
 
Budget execution consists of first gaining permission to spend appropriations approved 
by Congress through a separate budget submission process referred to as the allotment 
process. In allotment review, DOD must show how it intends to spend what has been 
appropriated, by quarter, month, or fiscal year for multiple year appropriations. This is 
always somewhat different than what was proposed in the President’s budget since 
appropriations must now be attributed to programs and allocated into the months they 
will be obligated (usually by quarters). After allotment approval is received from OMB 
and the Treasury, DOD begins the process of separating and distributing shares of the 
DOD budget to the military departments and services and other DOD commands and 
agencies. After they have received their spending allotment authority, these resource 
claimants begin to incur obligations to spend, and then liquidate their obligations through 
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outlay of money. During this process, comptrollers and budget officials at all levels of 
DOD monitor and control execution of programs and funding. At the mid point of the 
spending year, the military departments and services typically conduct a mid-year review 
to facilitate shifting of money to areas of highest need. At the end of the fiscal year 
(September), all DOD accounts must be reconciled with appropriations and spending 
must be accounted for prior to closing the accounts from further obligation and outlay 
(for annual accounts). Financial and management audits by military department audit 
agencies, the DOD Inspectors Generals, the General Accounting Office (GAO) and other 
entities follow the conclusion of execution and reporting. 
An overview of the new PPBES decision cycle is provided in Exhibits 1 and 2. 





Source: Secretary of Defense, Management Initiative Decision 913, 2003: 3. 
 
 




 Source: Secretary of Defense, Management Initiative Decision 913, 2003. 4.  
 
PPBES: Year One 
Management Initiative Decision 913 sets out a two-year budget and planning cycle within 
the framework of the four years in a Presidential administration. Year one requires 
“review and refinement” of the previous President's strategy and plans, including only 
limited changes in programs and budgets, an early national security strategy, and an “off-
year DPG.” As stated in MID-913, “The off-year DPG will be issued at the discretion of 
the Secretary of Defense…The off-year DPG will not introduce major changes to the 
defense program, except as specifically directed by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of 
Defense…However, a small and discrete number of programming changes will be 
required to reflect real world changes and as part of the continuing need to align the 
defense program with the defense strategy,” (Secretary of Defense, 2003a: 5). A major 
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objective of the off-year guidance will be to provide the planning and analysis necessary 
to identify major program issues for the next DPG. One of the benefits of the new four-
year cycle is that it fits the PPB process into the electoral cycle. Incoming administrations 
usually struggle to get their people on board in the first year and significant defense 
policy changes usually do not come until later. The new cycle recognizes this reality. 
Significant events do happen in year one. The National Security Strategy is issued at 
about mid-year and the Quadrennial Defense review begins shortly thereafter and is 
issued early in Year Two. These are significant guidances for defense strategy and 
resource allocation. 
PPBES: Year Two  
Year two in the new four-year framework is more intense in that the military departments 
and services and OSD will conduct full program, planning, budget and execution reviews 
to formalize the President's defense posture and strategy, including the resource portion 
of the strategy. In addition to a Quadrennial Defense Review issued early in the year, the 
second year will include a full, “on-year” Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), issued in 
May and designed to implement the QDR results. Previously, the QDR had been issued 
on 30 September in the first year of a Presidential administration. However, in the FY 
2003 Defense Authorization Act, Congress changed the QDR reporting requirement to 
the second year to provide new DOD leadership more time for analysis and preparation. 
Senior defense officials had argued to Congress that the requirement to submit a QDR in 
the first year was too much to ask of a new administration barely through the rigorous 
congressional process for confirmation of presidential appointees to head the DOD and 
military departments. Year two will see then a full POM and a full budget build. These 
result in a full FYDP build. 
PPBES: Year Three 
The new planning and budget process specifies that year three be used for “execution” of 
the President's defense plan and budget agenda as provided in the QDR and the previous 
year's DPG. Year three corresponds with FY 2005 in the budget cycle and could include 
an “off-year” DPG if so desired by the Secretary of Defense. This off-year guidance 
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could task new studies, or incorporate fact-of-life changes in acquisition programs 
including increased costs or schedule delays as well as congressionally mandated 
changes. In May 2003, Zakheim indicated that no 2005 DPG was to be prepared under 
the Bush administration and Rumsfeld. However, the Presidential elections of 2004 could 
change this plan. Year three is a year of refinement of objectives and metrics with only 
the most necessary program or budget change proposals considered. 
Careful examination of DOD execution of dollars and plans is a critical part of the new 
planning and budgeting process. Traditionally, budget execution has been left primarily 
to the military departments. However, the revised process provides OSD with greater 
opportunity to examine and critique the budget execution decisions of the military 
departments and services. Zakheim reported in February a widespread agreement in the 
DOD not to return to a comprehensive annual budget and program review; rather the 
intent was to use the off year to measure the “burn rate” (rate of spending) in an 
execution review. To this end, the comptroller said the review would include asking 
questions such as how money is being spent, if it should be moved to other areas and 
accounts, and the results achieved from execution.  
An important budget changed initiated by the Bush administration announced in February 
2003 and subsequently by the DOD Comptroller is implementation of “performance-
based budgeting,” to focus more on the costs of achieving desired military and 
programmatic outcomes, rather than concentrating budget review on the details of 
program administration and production. The driving military concept behind 
performance-based-budgeting (PBB) is the concept of “effects-based capabilities” for 
war fighting. The effects-based approach focuses on desired end results from a military 
action rather than the military action itself. Under this concept, military commanders 
specify the results, such as capture of territory, in addition to the amounts and types of 
forces needed to achieve the outcome.  
PPBES: Year Four 
Year four in the budget and planning cycle is characterized in MID-913 as the point 
where the achievements of a four-year Presidential administration are assessed. This year 
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will include preparation of a full DPG to refine the alignment between Presidential 
strategy and the DOD program and budget. As usual, the DPG will initiate and guide the 
cycle of military department and service POM and budget preparation, review and 
submission (for FY 2006). Then, the next full PPBES cycle will encompass Fiscal Years 
2006 to 2011.` 
X. REFORM EVENTS IN 2001-2003 
The programming-budgeting changes that constituted a redesigned PPBE system began 
in August of 2001, when SECDEF Rumsfeld announced that the POM and Budget cycle 
would be operated contemporaneously to speed up the review and decision process 
(Rumsfeld, 2001). On January 31, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld used the occasion of a 
speech at the National War College to unveil his transformation plans and part of the 
reasoning behind them. The following excerpt the question and answer period after the 
speech clearly indicates Rumsfeld’s dissatisfaction with the PPB system. 
Question: “...I was wondering if you could give us your thoughts on the need for 
transforming this support (PPB) system. [Cheers, whoops, applause.][Laughter.] 
SEC. RUMSFELD: [Laughs.] I'm not going to give you the particulars, but about eight, 
10 weeks ago I had to sit through a meeting with the president of the United States, and 
these nice folks came in and they started a briefing, and they explained exactly what was 
happening, and they said that...it starts with the presidential guidance, and then it comes 
to the secretary of Defense guidance, and then it goes down to the CINC, and then it's 
worked on, and then it proceeds all the way out to the other end, and here's what we're 
presenting today. And he had pictures of the president and a picture of the secretary of 
Defense up there, and I looked at it, and I said, "When did the president give that 
guidance?" And it was 24 months ago. It was another president. [Laughter.] I said, 
"When did the secretary of Defense give that guidance?" And it was 18 months ago. It 
was a different secretary of Defense. 
“And these nice folks, they worked their heads off, they -- just like beavers, and they 
produced this thing, and it came out. If -- you know, you -- it had nothing to do with 
today. It had nothing to do with anything that was going on today. And wonderful, 
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dedicated, fine, talented people doing ... work ... that was wasteful of their time, and a 
shame, and I felt badly.  These procedures that this department has are so powerful; it's 
like a train being loaded in San Francisco, the freight train. Car after car is filled the way 
someone believed it should be done six months ago, before September 11th. And then it 
starts rolling down the track, and it comes and it comes and it comes, and it arrives in 
New York City and it unloads, and it's nothing anyone needs.” 
Later Rumsfeld returned to this analogy. 
“These... freight trains that are going down the track, as I said earlier, don't connect. We 
can perfectly compare all the war risks between North Korea and Iraq and this and that, 
and it does not connect at all to the people risks, it doesn't connect to the modernization 
risks, it doesn't connect to the transformation risks. They're all on separate tracks, and 
there isn't any way to look at these. One's apples. The other's oranges. 
Now what we going to do about that? Is that what the question was? 
[Laughter.] We're going to do everything that is humanly possible. I am absolutely 
dumbfounded and shocked that it can work the way it works, and wonderful, talented 
people can work their heads off in it, and that we aren't capable of getting them to 
connect between them and to get them sufficiently fast and sufficiently flexible.” 
Toward the conclusion of the period, Rumsfeld made it clear that he felt the system 
needed to be fixed. 
“The way the Department of Defense runs, the budgeting system, the planning system is, 
broken. It is not serving the department or the country well. And yet it is inexorable. It 
just rolls along, like the freight train coming from San Francisco with the wrong things 
for New York. And there are plenty of people who look at it and don't know it's wrong. I 
sat in meeting after meeting, and people said, "Well, that's the way we do it. This is how 
it works. This is what it is." And, "Don't you understand that the only way to affect that is 
to reach back 2-1/2 years ago and load it properly?" And of course my answer is, "Don't 
you understand we didn't have -- we don't have 2-1/2 years to wait to change? We need to 
get at it."  
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Rumsfeld had already started DOD down this path by collapsing the programming and 
budgeting processes into one sequence as per his memo of August 2, 2001. 
 
The impact of this memo was dwarfed by the events of 11 September 2001 and 
subsequently, but it was a process direction and when business-as-usual was resumed, 
budget process players found that the game had changed. In addition to Rumsfeld’s 
critique of the PPB process, interviews with Navy FMB officials, fleet comptrollers and 
other DOD financial management executives revealed a number of concerns about the 
old consecutively phased PPBS process, including concerns about:  
• Inadequate Guidance: it was felt that the Defense Planning Guidance issued by 
SECDEF to initiate the POM process which led to decisions about what to fund 
for the budget year was often late and unaffordable and did not provide a clear 
statement of SECDEF priorities.  
•  Concurrent process flaws: program and budget processes appeared concurrent but 
were not well coordinated.  
• Continuous rework: the POM and budget were subject to disassembly, rebuilding 
and review every year.  
• False precision: programming for the acquisition process required excessive detail 
and was projected too far into the future years.  
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• Revisiting decisions: decisions made during one cycle were not always 
recognized and respected in the next.  
• Changing Rules: rules, expectations and metrics complied with in advance by the 
Navy were changed later in the process to facilitate cuts. 
 
Lastly, FMB executives believed that SECDEF oversight should be limited to those 
matters of true significance or policy compliance. Here it appears that the Navy budget-
makers were trying to keep some military department autonomy, but arguing for relative 
spheres of decision, some appropriate to SECDEF and some to the military department. 
As DOD simplified the PPB process, DON simplified its part of the process by dividing 
its budget accounts into three tiers, those driven by formula, those focused on 
procurement and acquisition, and all the rest. The investment accounts tied to weapons, 
ship or aircraft acquisition accounted for 36% of the Navy budget. While the Military 
Departments originate some investment account decisions, some are also originated by 
the CINCs through the Joint Chiefs staffing establishment and cleared through SECDEF 
and his Acquisition Assistant Secretary. This is an extensive and detailed review from 
many perspectives, military department, Joint Chiefs, war fighters, area commanders, one 
in which Congress also has an interest due to concerns over the amount of money 
required and where weapons will be built. This is the capital side of the operating budget 
which requires choices about what to build and then constant tending as to how the 
program is coming each year. The budget reforms of 2002-3 attempted to put the rest of 
the DON budget on automatic pilot by dividing accounts into those that had a historical 
base (11% of the budget) and those that had a performance model base (53%) and were 
driven by formulas. These included such accounts as the flying hour program, the ship 
operations program, training workload, Marine Corps operations, Aircraft Maintenance, 
Ship Maintenance, Spare parts, USMC Depot Maintenance, Facilities, and Base 
Operations. Secondary models included military Personnel (both active and reserve) and 
Civilian personnel. These models produced cost figures, but unlike the first group did not 
model performance. A manager was designated for each of these formula-driven modules 
and a validation process was begun to verify that the models were accurate and that the 
correct inputs were used. The object of the change was that in subsequent budgets these 
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models would automatically provide their part of the budget request and that the 
performance models would be able to specify outputs from dollars of input.  
 
Those expenses that were driven neither by formula nor investment were termed “level of 
effort programs.” These last items were to be based on a three year rolling average of 
what was actually spent and increased or decreased as the level of effort varied for the 
program. This is currently the scheme under which the Navy plans to operate its budget 
process as it goes forward with reform -- first, with a more formula driven budget and, 
secondly, with intense interest in the investment accounts and, thirdly, to focus within the 
base to free up more money for the investment. Implicit in this would seem to be concept 
that the readiness accounts will be replenished by supplemental appropriations when they 
become unbalanced by emergency increases in military operating requirements 
(optempo). Secretary Rumsfeld had expressed impatience in the January 2002 speech 
with a process that led to 100% preparation of a budget each year for what would turn out 
to be change to about 21% of it: 
“So you fashion 100 percent of a budget for a single year, and it comes back having been 
altered by 21 percent, with thousands of earmarks. That adds the number of people you 
have to have. It adds the amount of time it takes to do anything. It adds the lack of 
flexibility if you need -- if the world changes in between, so that you can function.”  
Certainly DON’s changes to its budget process were in keeping with Rumsfeld’s 
philosophical approach to process simplification. The major outcome of this thrust was to 
divide the process into on-year and off-year cycles. 
On-year Cycle (2002): Concurrent Program and Budget Review  
As noted, in 2002 the PPBES process was changed to run program and budget review 
concurrently. Prior to August 2001, the military departments and services developed and 
submitted their POMs to OSD for review in May. The services would then start to build 
their Budget Estimate Submissions (BES) based on the POM. In 2002, military 
departments and services were required to submit both their budget submission (BES) 
and their POM to OSD simultaneously in late August. Because of this change, the Navy 
budget submissions were developed based on Tentative POM (T-POM) control numbers 
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issued in late May. We view this change from the operator perspective with the budget 
office of the Pacific Fleet (CPF), a large field claimant.  
A CPF programming official explained the advantages of the concurrent POM and 
budget process as follows: 
It eliminates unnecessary duplication of effort.  Prior to the change, 
the POM would be finished in May.  Then, budgets would be 
prepared for OSD review.  Emerging issues could cause services to 
change the program while developing the budget…Gives the 
services longer to finish the POM while incorporating emergent 
budget issues.  Services can re-visit the program based on budget 
issues…Prior to the change, OPNAV N80 would finish the 
program and then it was "out of their hands…The new process 
leads to more cooperation between programmers and budgeters…I 
think it [the new process] gives claimants more input into the 
program…Take Information technology -- if many claimants have 
issues with funding, it can become a major issue.  Now you can 
revisit the POM; before you couldn't.  Claimants can also say they 
can't execute the program as funded by controls. (Reed, 2002) 
When the process ran consecutively, coordination was more difficult. If the POM was not 
completed until after CPF finished its budget, how could the POM guide or control the 
budget? Neither N-80 nor anyone else could “enforce” POM numbers. Budget staff 
believed the POM process was flawed, that it operated on a “fair share” principle where 
priorities were not realistic. They were not confident of the POM process that seemed to 
“give everybody something.” Budget staff had to “fix” the POM in the budget, at least for 
the budget year. This had consequences for future POM planning that programmers often 
objected to, because they did not support having the budget drive the POM, especially 
because it happened virtually every year after 1990 when budget staff were forced to 
make cuts and corrections irrespective of the POM. For these reasons and others, friction 
arose between the budget and POM communities. The concurrent POM- budget process 
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may ameliorate some of this tension.  
At CPF, comments by the Deputy Comptroller were reinforced by the head of the budget 
department and the comptroller.  Both agreed that the change could provide more 
coordination between programmers and budgeters.  According to the CPF Comptroller, 
 
Secretary Rumsfeld has been talking about transformation and new 
ways of doing things.  He’s saying we can't continue to think of 
things the way we always have.  To me, this is transformation 
applied to resource allocation, programming, budgeting, and 
requirements determination.  They're (OSD) looking to streamline 
things and make them more efficient, to eliminate redundancies, 
and to ask questions just once instead of over two different 
processes…When you have a concurrent process, you're forced to 
work together. (Reed, 2002) 
 
The budget department head echoed these comments: 
I think the intent was to streamline the process so that there’s not 
so much flux.  Before, once the program locked, you had to wait a 
whole cycle or try to fix the program in the budget.  What we're 
trying to do instead of trying to fix it (the program) in the budget is 
to make the program executable in the programming stage and 
only have to concern ourselves with pricing and pop-up issues in 
the budget…so there also were not as many required exhibits 
(Reed, 2002). 
While there was agreement among CPF staff on the reasoning behind the change to a 
concurrent program/budget process, there was some disagreement about the new process.  
Observers noted there was very little direction given as to how the new process was to be 
implemented. The only guidance provided initially was a one-page memo from SECDEF. 
The CPF Comptroller indicated that the change to a process that had been conducted in 
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much the same way for many years caused anxiety among personnel within the CPF 
programming and budgeting organization, but he, "…did not want to be too quick to 
jump to conclusions." (Reed, 2002) Comments from other staff members were not as 
encouraging.  One analyst described the process as "chaos."  As late as late June, 2002, 
after their original POM 2004 budget had been submitted to FMB based on draft POM 
control numbers, there were still questions among CPF staff on how the new process 
would work.   
In the end, CPF was able to work through issues related to the concurrent program/budget 
and submitted their DON FY 2003 budget on-time based on both programming and 
budgeting changes that occurred as a result of issue papers, comments and reviews at the 
FMB, N80 and other levels. 
It is useful to reflect on how these relationships change because of the change in the 
PPBES process.  According to Thompson (1967), and Nadler and Tushman (1988), there 
are three types of interdependence in complex organizations: 
• Pooled Interdependence 
• Sequential Interdependence 
• Reciprocal Interdependence  
Pooled interdependence occurs when separate units operate independently but are part of 
the same organization and share certain scarce resources.  An example is a bank with 
several branches.  Individual branches function independently of each other but share 
certain resources of the main corporate entity such as advertising or marketing.  The 
branch banks do not depend on each other for their functioning. 
Sequential interdependence occurs when a unit or task downstream of another depends on 
the prior unit’s output or task completion.  Sequential interdependence demands a greater 
degree of coordination than pooled functions.  The work of one unit can be affected by 
upstream units.  Coordination must exist to ensure that workflows remain constant.  An 
example of sequential interdependence would be an oil company.  First, oil must be 
extracted from the ground, then it must be refined into different products, then it is 
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shipped to customers.  One task cannot be completed prior to the previous tasks and 
coordination between tasks must exist to ensure that workflow remains constant. 
Resources must be expended to maintain such coordination. This type of dependence 
characterized the pre-2001 separate POM-budget review process. 
Under reciprocal interdependence, work groups must work continuously with other units 
in the production of common products.  Reciprocal interdependence imposes substantial 
problem solving requirements between units because no single unit can accomplish its 
task without the active contribution of other units. The new concurrent POM-budget 
review process is an example of reciprocal interdependence. As tasks become more 
interdependent, the amount of coordination and communication between tasks increases.  
Reciprocal interdependence represents the highest degree of interdependence and 
therefore the highest degree of required communication and coordination between units. 
As noted, prior to the 2001 POM-budget review change, the system operated during the 
preparation phase of PPBES with a high degree of sequential interdependence between 
programming and budgeting where each successive process (programming then 
budgeting) was dependent on the one prior to it. Once the input was received, 
downstream tasks were not supposed to have an effect on the output of the previous 
phase of action, i.e., budget changes were not supposed to cause changes in the existing 
POM.  However, this was not an accurate description of what actually happened as we 
have demonstrated. The 2001 change to establish a concurrent program/budget review 
process recognized that in reality there is a high degree of reciprocal interdependence 
between the two functions. Actions taken during the budgeting phase of PPBES have 
significant impact on the upstream process of programming.   
Personnel at CPF long recognized the reciprocal nature of planning and budgeting. Had 
the threat and budgetary environment been stable, perhaps no PPBES changes would 
have been necessary. However, neither condition held. The threat environment was not 
stable and the budgetary environment fluctuated during the 1990s and with the advent of 
the war on terrorism as operating tempo remained high in response to contingencies. As a 
result, there was friction throughout the system, most significantly at the top where the 
old PPB system was not producing the outputs desired by Secretary Rumsfeld quickly 
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enough. The problems with PPBS that irritated Secretary Rumsfeld had been identified 
by critics for decades but it took a determined SECDEF to make changes (Puritano. 1981; 
Jones and Bixler, 1992: 32). 
Off-year Cycle (2003): Limited, Incremental Change 
On February 3, 2003, DOD Comptroller Dov Zakheim presented the new DOD biennial 
budget part of the reform with the release of the President Bush's Fiscal Year 2004 
defense budget request. Zakheim indicated that DOD would use the off years when 
budgets would not be prepared from scratch to examine how well DOD was executing its 
programs and dollars (Secretary of Defense, 2003a). He noted that as of this budget (FY 
2004) FY-05 would be an “off year” in which only significant revisions to the budget 
would be requested from Congress. This meant that the budget process conducted during 
the summer and fall of 2003 to prepare the FY2005 budget would be significantly 
changed.  For example, DOD will not prepare the Program Objective Memoranda (POM) 
or budget estimates for FY-05. Instead, OSD will use estimates for FY 2005 as they were 
estimated in the FY 2004 budget and Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), which 
covers FY 2004 to FY 2009. An updating mechanism has been created for the off-years, 
e.g. FY05.  
Military Departments and CINCS may create Program Change Proposals (PCPs) to affect 
the POM and Budget Change Proposals (BCPs) to speak to new budget needs. The PCPs 
allow for fact of life changes to the previous year’s POM; they are meant to be few and of 
relatively large size. Guidance for 2003 indicated the PCPs had to exceed a set dollar 
threshold or have serious policy and programmatic implications. For example, in 2003 
the Navy submitted only three PCPs, one worth $100 million that involved 450 line 
items. The Navy would submit only three PCP’s in 2003. For all of DOD the number of 
PCPs was estimated to be about 120.  For the CINCs, the PCPs are a new tool provided 
them in the PPBE process, but like the military departments, they have to suggest offsets. 
For example, if a CINC wants to increase force protection in one area at a certain cost, he 
has to suggest weakening force protection in another area as an offset for the increase. 
This is meant to be a zero-sum game. Changes have to be accompanied by offsets or 
billpayers. As is usual with any offset procedure, claimants who submit either PCPs or 
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BCPs take the risk that the offsets they suggest will be accepted, but the accompanying 
change proposals the offsets were intended to fund might not be. In such cases, the offset 
reveals a pot of money for a lower priority item that might be directed to another area. 
The budget change proposals were expected to be more numerous but smaller. They too 
would be largely fact of life changes (e.g. cost increases, schedule delays, new 
congressional directives) and would have to be paid for by offsets. Although the 
individual BCP need not be offset, the package of offsets provided by a Military 
Department has to be offset and provide a zero balance change. The FY 2006 budget 
request will be prepared completely anew, marking the first biennial POM and budget in 
the new two-year cycle. A Defense Planning Guidance will be prepared by OSD to guide 
the FY 2006 process. 
In April 2003 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld canceled the 2005 DPG due to the 
budget process changes announced in February by Zakheim to concentrate Pentagon 
analytical resources on determining whether Saddam Hussein's ouster and the 
progression of the war on terrorism had mandated additional changes in the Bush 
administration national defense strategy. In addition to prioritizing how OSD believes 
military dollars should be spent in upcoming years, the DPG typically calls for studies on 
top issues and indicates new strategies to be undertaken. Rumsfeld’s action violated no 
rules, as the Secretary of Defense is not legally required to prepare an annual Defense 
Planning Guidance.  
The exhibit below clearly shows the change from the old ppb systems to the new PPBES 
systems as implemented by the Department of the Navy. 
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Budget Reform and Defense Transformation 
The reform of PPB was both part of and separate from a greater effort for defense 
transformation. A statement supporting the “Defense Transformation Act for the 21st 
Century” (DTA) was delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to the 
House Government Reform Committee on May 6, 2003 (Wolfowitz, 2003). Wolfowitz 
indicated the desire of the Bush administration and Secretary Rumsfeld to implement 
broad management, financial and budgetary reform in DOD. Subsequent to this 
presentation, Congress later passed portions of the DTA as part of the Defense 
Authorization Act of 2003, but was reluctant to give DOD certain broad discretionary 
powers that it had sought in certain areas. Prior to submission of DTA to Congress in 
final form on April 10, 2003 in the months leading up to its formal delivery, DOD 
convened more than 100 meetings with members and staff to develop and debate its 
various provisions.  
The Defense Transformation Act for the 21st Century represents comprehensive reform to 
address serious problems in DOD management systems. The Act is intended to provide 
the military departments and services greater flexibility to respond effectively to 
changing threats and the ability to move resources more rapidly, and to put new weapons 
systems in the field more quickly. The Act includes more flexible rules for managing the 
flow of money and personnel in DOD to facilitate response to threat requirements. The 
DTA includes authority for DOD to convert a number of non-military functions that have 
been assigned to DOD over the years to other, more appropriate departments. The DTA 
authorizes elimination of regulations that make it difficult for small firms to do business 
with DOD. It includes expanded authority for competitive outsourcing to move military 
personnel out of non-military jobs and back into the field. It also includes measures to 
protect military training ranges. In support of the DTA, Secretary Rumsfeld made a plea 
for greater delegation of authority and freedom from micromanagement from Congress 
(Rumsfeld, 2003: 35). He cited that: 
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 • The defense authorization bill had grown from only one page in 1962 to a “whopping” 
534 pages in 2001. 
 
• DOD is required to prepare and submit some 26,000 pages of justification and more 
than 800 required reports to Congress each year -- many of marginal value, most 
probably not read. Since 1975, the time it takes to produce a new weapons system has 
doubled, even as new technologies are arriving in years and months, not decades. 
(Rumsfeld, 2003: 35) 
 
The possibility of obtaining increased delegation of authority from Congress to DOD has 
captivated defense budget analysts and reformers since the late 1960s. Prior to the 1960s 
the defense program and budget was approved in a far less controversial manner than the 
way the process has operated since “hawks’ and “doves” began a protracted battle in the 
halls of Congress over the Vietnam war. Objections to the Vietnam War and the spending 
plans of President Lyndon Johnson caused an increase in congressional authorization and 
appropriation detail and specificity, and greater budget execution oversight. The need for 
more managerial flexibility and delegation of authority from Congress in budget 
execution has been supported by critics of congressional defense budgeting and 
management for decades (Jones and Bixler, 1992; Gansler, 1989; Fox, 1988; Kanter, 
1983, Augustine, 1983; Luttwak, 1982).  
 
The DTA also proposed eliminating 100 reports to Congress and proposed eliminating 
the remaining reporting requirements after five years. In the acquisition area, the Selected 
Acquisition Reports would no longer be provided Congress. Congressmen Obey and 
Spratt (2003) argued these were critical to Congress and its agent GAO obtaining 
information to discharge its oversight responsibilities. In particular, they said that the 
Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) provided information about cost overruns, technical 
failures and schedule delays in weapons development. The authors argued that the DTA 
as proposed resulted in an “…unprecedented reduction in Congressional oversight and 
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accountability and in some cases unlimited increases in the powers of the Secretary of 
Defense.” (Obey and Spratt, 2003: 2)  
 
In conclusion, Representatives Obey and Spratt asked why Congress should, “…rush to 
overhaul an organization that has yet again demonstrated its ability to perform to the 
highest standards on the battlefield.” (Obey and Spratt, 2003: 12) While Republicans 
generally supported the Wolfowitz DTA proposal, the argument went beyond party lines 
as serious questions were raised about the potential of the reforms to endanger 
congressional ability to fulfill its constitutionally mandated oversight role. History 
indicates that Congress moves slowly, or not at all, in delegating its prerogatives with 
respect to defense. 
 
Because the 2001-2003 PPBES reforms were made without explicit congressional 
approval, we may ask what this means with respect to the desirability of further 
delegation of authority from Congress to DOD. From our view, the PPBES cycle timing 
changes were sensible given that new administrations rarely have the people in place or 
the insights necessary to put programs in place and prepare budget initiatives in the first 
year (the administration of Ronald Reagan is a notable exception). Thus, designating the 
first year for review of national security strategy and the work on the Quadrennial 
Defense Review sets the scene for a complete budget build in the second year. 
Designating the off years as years of minimal change, but allowing mechanisms for 
changes that do need to be made separately in program change proposals and budget 
change proposals also seems sensible and should cut down the turmoil involved in a 
complete POM-Budget rebuild each year. Therefore, we conclude that in this case, DOD 
change initiatives moved in the right direction without any supervision or oversight from 
Congress.  
CONCLUSIONS 
With respect to long-range DOD planning in the first phase of PPBES, we may observe 
that during the 1990s it was clear that the shift from a Cold war mentality to a new 
framework was proceeding slowly. The gist of what was necessary in the post-Cold war 
world did not seem clear. Despite all the discussion of asymmetric threat and successive 
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preparation and reviews of the QDR, much of the defense budget seemed focused toward 
a Cold War scenario. Meanwhile the defense establishment was contracted by about 35% 
and U. S. forces were employed in a large number of small scale conflicts in the 1990’s 
after the first Gulf War. Still, the precise nature of the threat was not clear; was our own 
activism a problem, were there really inimical forces out there, and if so, what was 
needed were all difficult questions. The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 ended this 
period of doubt and confused reflection.  
 
It is routinely acknowledged that the planning component has been the weakest part of 
PPBS for decades. Part of this is due to the contingent nature of threat assessment while 
other impediments include the sheer volume of information and absence of data 
coordination. In order for DOD to plan to counter threat effectively, it seems to us that a 
capabilities-based planning process within PPBES, rather than a theater-based approach, 
is one way to tear loose from the old bipolar geographic analyses that focused on the 
USSR, potential enemies in Asia or elsewhere. Instead, it is critical to ask what 
capabilities the U. S. needs to meet threats wherever they occur, especially given that the 
terrorist threat has a personal or group basis less geographically bound.  
 
The deployment of U. S. forces since September 11, 2001 illustrates new concepts in 
joint operation, the use of Special Forces and the application of joint forces in unique 
ways, supported by traditional forces using traditional doctrines. Nonetheless, it is a new 
mix. Much of the transformation in military affairs that has been ongoing since the mid-
1990s is driven by new threats that seem to emerge almost daily. All this points to the 
linkage between changes in military war fighting and PPBES planning. 
 
It is obvious that important changes have been made in the DOD planning and budgeting 
process. The simultaneous execution of the POM and budget review and its consolidation 
into one data base is an important change. In the old system, a good POM could still be 
lost on the way to the final budget. In addition, sometimes the budget process ended up 
doing a lot or reprogramming and re-making of decisions that would have been better 
done in a POM exercise. For example, the 2003 POM process started by doing a pricing 
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review of the shipbuilding budget. This is a budget drill and in the old PPB system would 
have been done in the budget process long after the POM had been completed. Observers 
comment that when such drills (re-pricing the shipbuilding account for inflation etc.) 
result in a big bill that has to be paid, it is good to have that bill considered and paid up 
front at the beginning of the process in the POM where large dollar changes can be made 
more easily. They also felt that doing the POM and budget simultaneously should result 
in fewer surprises and less re-programming of changes to the POM in the budget process 
than there used to be. They felt that the process should be quicker, but less linear, a 
layered process rather than a sequential process. The routing of all products of the POM 
and the budget into one database was seen to be a significant move to help resolve some 
of this added complexity.  
 
Secondly, the outcome focus of the process is an important change. Secretary Rumsfeld 
has emphasized outcomes and the Navy approach illustrates this concern in two ways. 
The procurement accounts are focused around the outcomes each weapon system bought 
will provide and the performance models for steaming hours and flying hours are also 
outcome focused. As has been stated above, this covers almost 90% of the Navy budget. 
Nevertheless, Congress still appropriates by line item and DOD has to be able to translate 
capabilities into budget items and make winning arguments for those translations. The 
fact is that budget lines (line-items) make it easy for Congress to buy things and what has 
not changed is where the power of the purse is located. In the words of one DOD budget 
player, “…there are a lot of changes, but what has not been changed is the Constitution. 
Changes will end when they bump into things that are Constitutional. The appropriation 
process is still a congressional process and changes in the pentagon process have to be 
responsive to the needs of Congress. The menu of changes the pentagon can pursue is not 
unlimited.” 
 
Thirdly, the new process put SECDEF into the process at the early stages, “in the driver’s 
seat,” in the words of one budgeteer. Decisions in the new PPBES are intended to reach 
the Secretary before the decision has become a foregone conclusion, while options are 
still open, and while important and large-scale changes can still be made. When SECDEF 
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inputs come at the end of the stream of decisions, some decisions that could be taken get 
pre-empted simply because they might cause too much breakage in other programs or 
because everyone has already become committed to the likely outcomes of the decision. 
Secretary Rumsfeld had a clear interest in transformation, but not all communities within 
the defense establishment were equally committed or committed at all to Rumsfeld’s 
vision. As we have noted, inserting SECDEF in the decision process early stands up so 
long as history proves the decisions SECDEF make are right. While this is true whether 
SECDEF input is early or late, inserting SECDEF early in the PPBES process puts a 
larger burden of proof on SECDEF. Veteran observers see these changes as an evolving 
process, cautioning officers bound for the pentagon in a couple of years not to bother 
memorizing the new process until they get there since it has changed significantly since 
2001 and will continue to change.  
 
Lastly, the new emphasis on execution seems an important change, but it is too early to 
speculate on how this will turn out. It seems clear that no one wants to be viewed as 
decreasing military effectiveness in the name of saving dollars. Through 2003 a 
continuing theme of administration critics was that the U. S. was trying to do Iraq “on the 
cheap” with not enough troops and not enough of the right kind of troops. If the new 
emphasis on execution becomes a code word for efficiency and this is parsed into “doing 
things on the cheap,” then the emphasis on execution will not have important or long 
lasting effects.  
 
The 2003 budget process within DOD was dramatically changed. The 2003 process 
exemplifies incrementalism triumphant. Only changes to the POM and the budget were 
brought forward in 2003. This is a dramatic change from past. Aaron Wildavsky in 
developing the concept of incrementalism may have ignored defense, but DOD appears 
to have gone to school on Wildavsky. The result of the 2003 budget process is that unless 
a budget change proposal is explicitly approved, then a unit’s budget is the same as it was 
the previous year; in Wildavsky’s terms, the base is re-appropriated. Thus, if a unit does 
well in the on-year cycle (second and fourth year), it may carry some ‘fat’ through the 
off-years. This would seem to intensify the struggles during the on-year processes, 
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making the stakes higher. Success is rewarded for two years and failure is doubly 
penalized, i.e., remember to change in the off year, off-sets have to be offered up, so the 
only way to get better in the off-year is by giving up something else. In the off-year 
cycles, only changes to the base are explicitly considered, both in the Program Change 
Proposals for the POM (big dollar numbers, but fewer of them) and Budget Change 
Proposals for the budget (more, but smaller dollars). However, there is an interesting 
twist to this. Changes may come from anywhere someone has an issue, e.g. the military 
services, combatant commanders, and Assistant and Undersecretaries of Defense.  
 
Budget processes normally focus around ownership. For example, the concept of a 
claimant or a budget submitting office identifies who will submit a budget. They alone 
control what goes into this submission. This new process seems to empower friends and 
neighbors to examine how a neighbor is managing his property and submit a program or 
budget change proposal if the neighbor is not doing the right things, by for example 
putting in a budget change for more frequent mowing of the lawn or a program change 
for construction of a two car garage. Suppose an Under Secretary of Defense believes the 
Army should provide more force protection to an Air Force base and submits a program 
change proposal to do so; since these must have offsets, who will be designated as 
billpayer is a good question. The Under Secretary is unlikely to have any money; thus 
Army might have to pay that bill or Air Force. No matter who is selected as the billpayer, 
they will have to make an adjustment to their budget, just as you would were a neighbor 
able to dictate that you have to paint your house more frequently and pay for it by 
decreasing your entertainment budget.  Thus, this new system is incrementalism with 
enhanced pluralism. Disinterested neighbors with good ideas have the opportunity to 
insert them in other people’s budgets. Some observers will say that some of this has 
always gone on, but now the process is formal and invitations have been extended to 
players at various levels within DOD. Then, during the second and fourth years of this 
new PPBES cycle, zero-based budgeting is invited, based on the Quadrennial Defense 
Review and the National Security Strategy. This seems like a scenario doomed to fail 
because complex organizations have difficulty in adapting to radically different routines, 
e. g. incremental and zero-based procedures. For DOD, it must be remembered that the 
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full year cycles are largely incremental also, given no dramatic change in the threat. This 
new process is likely to work most satisfactorily only at the top and only if top-level 
players are somewhat restrained about their intrusions into the domains of other players.  
 
The lag time for full and satisfactory implementation of DOD-level macro changes in 
planning, programming and budgeting is probably two to four years, although many 
wrinkles will be worked out by the military departments after the first new cycle has been 
completed. However, it is understood by seasoned observers of such change that the 
solutions and new processes developed by the military departments will differ by service 
and therefore some degree of incompatibility between different service solutions is 
inevitable despite the intention of DOD decision makers to prevent this from happening. 
DOD prefers uniformity but this is not possible, and probably not desirable, given the 
highly differentiated resource management systems and processes used by the respective 
military departments and services.  
 
XI. Implications for DHS 
 
We have spent some time discussing the history and present practice of PPB in DOD in 
order to arrive at a place where we can give voice to considerations and concerns for 
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PPBS:   Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
PPG:     Program Planning Guidance
RAP:     Resource Allocation Plan
RAD:     Resource Allocation Decisions
PBD:     Program Budget Decision





In our opinion, the adoption of PPB in DHS is exactly the right thing to do because it 
forces a regular consideration of the future and planned resourcing to meet that future. No 
other budget system does that, in our opinion, so well. The hiker who keeps his eyes on 
the ground and keeps moving forward without consulting his map and his goal risks 
expending great amounts of energy without moving any closer to his goal. PPB provides 
both goals and waypoints for checking against those goals. Nonetheless, PPB is not an 
automatic system, nor is the budgeting environment for DHS simple. We now examine 
some of these complexities:  
1. The threat is asymmetrical, real, and a moving target. Continual vigilance, 
evaluation, and evolution will be necessary. The organizational task is not simple, nor is 
the resourcing task. Continuous evaluation to respond to a changing environment will be 
necessary. There must be a strategy and part of that strategy must be to coordinate public 
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and private efforts. The terrorists of 9-11-2001 were able to achieve homeland 
destruction, unlike any other foe since the Civil War. It had severe repercussions for the 
airline industry and the stock market. The anthrax scares of 2001 interrupted the orderly 
operation of the post office and the daily business of Congress, if only for a short interval. 
These events indicated how vulnerable an open society is to demented enemies. This 
makes creating a threat-determining scenario more complex. It also emphasizes that a 
business as usual, reactive, incremental approach is not good enough.   
Unfortunately, the pathway is not clear and critics do not agree.  For example, Brookings 
(2002) made several recommendations about homeland security in 2002, some of which 
have come to pass and some of which have not. First Brookings suggested that a 
Department of Homeland Security was not necessary and might actually be a less 
effective choice given the administration involved and the fact that significant parts of the 
mission would still be outside such a department. Brookings then argued for a homeland 
security planning process much like that of the NSC in defense, where homeland security 
directives would be issued after being discussed at meetings chaired by the President.  
Other Brookings recommendations in this report included: 
• Strengthening of the budgetary role of the homeland security director by the creation 
of a new, dual-hatted position: senior director of OHS for budget policy and associate 
director of OMB for homeland security.  
• Creating a cadre of agency officials could be deployed to the location of a terrorist 
incident to work with state and local officials and coordinate the federal government's 
response.  
• Establishing a Federal Border Agency to include the Coast Guard, the Customs 
Service, the enforcement arm of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(including the Border Patrol), the Agriculture Quarantine Inspection program, and 
probably the new Transportation Security Agency.  
• Establishing under the Secretary of Defense, a new Northern Command to protect the 
homeland and a new post of under secretary for homeland security.  
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• Returning the National Guard to its traditional, primary responsibility of homeland 
defense.  
• Establishing appropriations subcommittees in Congress for homeland security, and a 
joint committee to exercise broad oversight.  
• Last and probably not least, the Homeland Security Council should be made a 
statutory agency in the Executive Office of the President, with its Director subject to 
Senate confirmation.  
 
Almost all of these items were superceded by the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security.  A northern command has been created in DOD and how it works 
out its mission with DHS will be an evolutionary process. Congress created appropriation 
subcommittees for Homeland Security and passed a separate appropriation bill for it in 
2003 (HR2555, House Report 108-90, PL 108-90 on 10/01/03). The situation insofar as 
budget and authorizing committees are concerned is less clear.  
Brookings also observed that there was a need to focus on coordination not only at the 
federal level but also at the state and local level and at the interface with the private 
sector, commenting that this effort has..." not gotten sufficient attention by state and local 
officials, by the private sector itself, and this reorganization effort needs to be paralleled 
with appropriate attention towards the state and local effort. Brookings also suggested 
that there was a parallel with defense strategy in the sense that defense was moving from 
the old geopolitical state-based framework to capabilities based strategizing in terms of 
what we would need to meet the threat wherever it might appear. In the Quadrennial 
Defense Review, Rumsfeld argued that we needed to move away from a threat-based 
approach to developing our national capabilities and our national military strategy to one 
that he called a capabilities-based approach. He argued that given the uncertainty about 
the nature of our adversaries and the nature of our threats and particularly with the rise of 
non-state actors and asymmetrical threats, that it was simply no longer possible to 
develop specific scenarios in which we could put in effect all our eggs in that basket. But 
rather we needed to think about the ranges of capabilities that we needed given the 
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uncertainty (O’Hanlon, 2002). This certainly applies to strategizing for homeland 
security. 
2. The funding system is intergovernmental and frictions are inherent within it. 
It is obvious that the federal government has to provide some money to state and local 
governments in critical areas. Most people seem agreed that money ought to go to first 
responders, but there is much less agreement on how that money gets to its targets. States 
are the logical middlemen, but some states have few people and miles of border while 
other states have large populations at risk, and a few states have both factors. In 2002 the 
first round of funding was distributed on the formula embedded in the USA Patriot Act 
passed in response to 9-11. This formula favored states as units and ended up giving more 
money to less populated states than to the more populated ones. Russakoff and Sanchez 
report (2003) that among the formula's authors was then-Senate Judiciary Chairman 
Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), whose state gets more than six times as much money per capita 
as California under the formula. A spokesman for Leahy said smaller states need more 
money because their communities do not have large standing police forces to respond to 
emergencies. "Small states have security concerns, too," the spokesman said. "Protection 
of Vermont's northern border benefits the whole country. What if a terrorist got across 
and went to New York?" 
It is also clear that wherever the legal burden for protecting borders is placed, in reality it 
is going to be a joint task. Some feel this is clearly a federal, but it is also clear that state’s 
have a responsibility to do their share, if no more than provide additional manpower in 
times of crisis. Not surprisingly, state Governors would like to see the federal 
government pick up the cost of all homeland security expenses. In February 2003, at their 
winter meeting they voted unanimously to include homeland security -- along with 
Medicaid, special education and Bush's No Child Left Behind schools initiative -- as an 
"unfunded mandate" on states with which they need more federal help. No one doubts 
that the needs here are large, ranging from equipping firefighters with protective suits to 
constructing big-city emergency operations centers to providing U.S. ports with adequate 
security fences, the street-level demands of protecting U.S. citizens and infrastructure 
desperately require federal attention. Russakoff and Sanchez (2003) argue that local 
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officials believe the main problem is money, not identification of what needs to be done, 
and worry that state and federal deficits and pressing defense needs will limit the amount 
of federal money which can be directed toward defense. As a result, experts worry that 
spending may not keep up with the threat. "If you ask, is the government spending money 
to keep pace with the threats, then the answer is no," said Stephen Flynn, who heads the 
Council on Foreign Relations' research on homeland defense. "When it comes to moving 
resources, this just doesn't feel like Pearl Harbor. . . . We're in a war, for God's sake, and 
we're a rich country."  The needs seem obvious and meritorious. For example, in Yuma 
County, Ariz., home to two U.S. military bases, Sheriff Ralph E. Ogden said the most 
pressing need is a multimillion-dollar radio system that would allow federal, state and 
local officials to communicate in an emergency. "We probably have 50 police or law 
enforcement agencies within 60 miles of where I'm sitting right now, and very few of us 
can talk to each other," Ogden said. J.R. Thomas, director of emergency management for 
Franklin County, Ohio, which includes Columbus, said federal funds are needed to buy 
1,500 respirators for police officers and radiation detectors that will allow firefighters to 
determine whether they are responding to a "dirty bomb" or some other radioactive 
emission. Yet while the need is obvious, what to buy is not. For example local officials 
need federal advice on buying such high-tech equipment, according to Thomas, recalling 
the county's recent purchase of a device to detect biological agents: "It just wasn't any 
good. We don't have the expertise to be able to tell one piece of detection equipment from 
another. We're relying either on salespeople or word of mouth from other jurisdictions."  
Thus DHS will have to provide money and guidance about what to buy.  And for those 
who think that this can be an off the shelf purchase because homeland security involves 
known and readily available technologies, it is useful to remember that part of meeting 
the threat will involve detecting subtle biological and chemical agents. It is possible that 
developing such equipment could take years, as does fielding a complex piece of defense 
equipment, in a process that has a life of its own. Moreover, in this process of equipping 
the lower levels of government, there will always be leakage. For example, in Salt Lake 
City, emergency manager Michael Stever said the city's biggest need is a state-of-the-art 
emergency communications operations center that could survive an attack. "Right now, 
we use regular old conference rooms where we add telephones," he said. The first round 
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of federal money to build emergency operations centers yielded $50,000 for Utah, Stever 
said. "We didn't see a dime," he said. Only 3 percent of local health departments surveyed 
by the National Association of County and City Health Officials last month said they 
were "fully prepared" for a bioterrorism emergency. U.S. port authorities say their 
operations are also woefully underfunded. Last month, the Coast Guard released a study 
on the security requirements of every major U.S. port, concluding that they need $1 
billion in the first year and $500 million annually for the next nine years. The nation's 
ports have received $318 million in federal counterterrorism funds since Sept. 11, 2001. 
Huge gantry cranes and warehouses at U.S. ports are typically guarded by minimally 
trained private security squads, and the public often can mingle with stevedores. Many 
ports, such as the ones in Los Angeles and Long Beach, are interspersed with yacht clubs, 
condo complexes, seafood restaurants, fishing harbors and the like. Last year, the port of 
Los Angeles applied for $53 million in federal security funds but received $1.5 million, 
which it had to split with Long Beach. Experts say a major terrorist strike at the Los 
Angeles-Long Beach port complex could be more economically catastrophic than an 
attack on almost any other target in the country. While security experts say the 
government needs to play a larger role in drawing up security standards and funding 
upgrades in protection at some of the nation's private industrial operations, such as 
trucking firms, natural gas pipelines, electrical grids, water systems and nuclear and 
chemical plants, federal officials have warned against expecting such money anytime 
soon. 
  
No one should expect the argument around “what is a fair share?” to be simple or easily 
solved. Determining the appropriate federal share is "one of the thorniest questions we 
are going to face," said House Homeland Security Appropriations subcommittee 
chairman Harold Rogers (R-Ky.). Just how thorny was clear in the initial round of 
Homeland Security grants released this year – about $600 million nationally. Despite a 
concentration of likely terror targets in population centers, smaller states received much 
more money per capita than large ones, with California and New York running last. 
California received $1.33 per person and New York $1.38, while Wyoming got $9.78, 
Vermont, $8.15 and Alaska, $7.97. The national average was $3.29. (The study was done 
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by New York City and compared the largest states with the smallest; it did not include 
Maryland or Virginia.) 
 
Unusual frictions are to be expected. When the federal government raises the alert 
status, states and local governments respond by putting more police and fire on the street 
or on alert. To do this they must pay more overtime or compensatory time. This is a real 
cost to them. If alerts to a higher status become more frequent, localities may respond 
with less than the optimal amount of protection, because providing the full amount is 
expensive and besides nothing happened last time. This is not a recipe for a good 
outcome. The current fiscal crisis has taken its toll on homeland security provision. A 
survey by the Boston Globe in the spring of 2003 found that the 10 largest police 
departments in Massachusetts have 424 fewer officers than they did a year ago and will 
lose at least 50 more by July 1 as a result of state budget cuts in local aid. The state has 
received its allotted $11.7 million in homeland security grants, but Gov. Mitt Romney (R) 
and other state officials estimate their costs at almost five times that amount. As can be 
seen here, the federal government in 2003 did not provide full cost coverage. 
 
3. The new department is more complex than old DOD: a department out of 22 
separate agencies and 180,000 civil servants. Some lessons from DOD will not fit, in 
some ways, to deter or to destroy is much simpler than to investigate and protect. It has 
already been seen that DHS’s activities are very diverse, from enforcement to research to 
implementation7:  
 
4. Other departments still have major responsibilities....and they may underperform 
Many of the country's most prominent national monuments and parks lack adequate 
defenses against terrorism, according to the Department of Interior's Inspector General 
Earl E. Devaney who criticizes the National Park Service for "lackadaisical" security 
                                                 
7  Homeland Security Boosts Funds on Antimissile Plan: $100 Million Aimed at Protecting Jetliners 
Electronically By John Mintz, Washington Post Staff Writer Friday, September 19, 2003; Page A04  
The Department of Homeland Security will spend $100 million, more than initially planned, to explore the 
feasibility of outfitting commercial jetliners with electronic devices that would protect the aircraft from 
missiles fired by terrorists on the ground 
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procedures, ineffective patrols and staffing, and a "nonchalance" among some officials 
who do not accept the potential threat.  
"The National Park Service has failed to successfully adapt its mission and priorities to 
reflect its new security responsibilities and commitment to the enhanced protection of our 
nation's most treasured monuments and memorials from terrorism," according to the  24-
page IG report (Lee, 2003).  
 
 5. Definition of anti-terror mission is still evolving and mixed in with other criminal 
justice missions. Unlike external defense, homeland security seems a more complex task 
which may overlap in some instances what might be considered public safety from 
criminal behavior, a task primarily given to local governments and circumscribed by 
constitutional and legal guarantees such as due process. The strategic planners will have 
to map their issues carefully here (Eggen, 2003).  
 
6. The lack of inter-agency cooperation could decrease program effectiveness, even 
if the rivalry is not as bad as that of Army and Navy in the post WWII period. For 
example, Schmidt and Farah (2003) reported that bureaucratic infighting between the FBI 
and the Department of Homeland Security was hampering progress in the largest 
investigation of suspected terrorism financing in the United States, according to federal 
law enforcement sources. The FBI was given jurisdiction over all terrorism financing 
investigations in March, when the Customs Service became part of the newly created 
Department of Homeland Security. It has since moved to take over the sprawling 
investigation of an interlocking network of Northern Virginia-based charities and 
businesses that are suspected of funneling millions of dollars to al Qaeda and other 
Middle Eastern terrorist organizations.  
But the Homeland Security agents who developed the case have been reluctant to give up 
the investigation, and the FBI's involvement in the probe has been slowed, officials with 
both agencies said.  
Both sides acknowledged the difficulty of transferring authority for a complex financial 
investigation that had been underway for a year and a half. The FBI was given primacy in 
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terrorism financing investigations under a written agreement reached earlier this year by 
Attorney General John D. Ashcroft and Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge.  
FBI officials have complained about the difficulty gaining entree into an investigation 
that could touch on other cases in many jurisdictions. Homeland Security officials say the 
FBI is smarting at not getting credit for victories in an investigation it previously showed 
little interest in pursuing. Inter agency co-ordination problems are a fact of life in federal 
government programs. Undoubtedly these will be worked out over time.   
 
7. There is no blank check for HS and disagreement exists about how much is 
enough, just as in defense. 
While there is a mandate from the public to pay for homeland security, Congress no 
longer interprets this as a blank check. Moreover, homeland security issues are not 
exempt from politics as usual. In WWII, the military had a blank check. In VN, 
supplementals were submitted and financed for the cost of the war as it was being 
conducted each year, with victory being assumed at the end of each year. From 1945 to 
1965 foreign policy and defense were basically bi-partisan issues. There were party 
positions, but they were closely aligned and policy was supported by most of both parties. 
Consensus existed. The operational definition of consensus on homeland security is still 
evolving in 2003. Helen Dewar (Dewar, 2003; Mintz,2003) observed that funding battles 
for DHS during the summer of 2003 were largely determined on a party line basis, with 
the Democrats arguing that not enough is being spent for homeland security and the 
Republicans responding that it is not good business just to throw money at the problem. 
Thus Senator Byrd’s proposal which sought to add $602 million for transit security; 
$729.5 million for police, firefighters and "first responders"; $238.5 million for border 
protections; $100 million to safeguard air cargo; and $80 million to protect chemical 
facilities was defeated.  
Sen. Thad Cochran (R-Miss.), chairman of the new appropriations subcommittee for 
homeland security, noted that there was "no end to the list of ways we could spend 
additional funds on homeland security," and suggested that Congress has already pumped 
billions of dollars into security programs. He said spending is constrained by allocations 
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imposed by the budget that Congress approved earlier in the year and, in many cases, by 
practical limits on how much can be spent in a year (Dewar, 2003). Thus just as is true 
with defense, politics are going to play in DHS decisions, why should any other outcome 
be expected? This comment does make the point that HS is now a part of the budget 
resolution process and as such it will follow the relatively disciplined rhythms of the 
congressional budget process.  
8. Layered structure of fiscal federalism creates potential leaks for funding 
programs targeting specific levels of governments; money channeled through states for 
subordinate levels of government is subjected to “taxes.” Operationally, this happens in 
DOD and Congress has used such vehicles as fences, floors, and ceilings to ensure that 
money gets to where Congress intended it to go. This is a complex relationship, and a 
coalition of big city mayors has already suggested an alternative pattern for passing funds 
through by suggesting that Congress give them the money directly, rather than let it leak 
away to taxes and withholds. Speaking for a coalition of Mayors, Louisville Mayor  Jerry 
Abramson urged federal officials today to bypass state governments and give them the 
money they need to beef up homeland security. "I'm not asking for a handout, I'm asking 
for a partnership," Louisville Mayor Jerry Abramson (AP, 2003) told Undersecretary of 
Homeland Security Michael D. Brown at the U.S. Conference of Mayors. Brown 
responded that the federal government did not want to break up partnerships it had forged 
over the years with state governments through agencies such as the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, which handles natural disasters. However, he did note that 
Congress had recently ordered 80 percent of the funding for homeland security projects 
to go to first responders in cities and counties, and limited to 20 percent the amount state 
governments can keep. Mayors had complained that states were skimming federal money 
for prevention, while they need it to equip and train police and firefighters who treat 
casualties. Abramson said that in the first round of homeland security funding, Kentucky 
received $9 million and only $200,000 went to his city. "We have 20 percent of the state's 
population and yet we got just 2 percent of the money. You don't need to tell me that's 
wrong." (AP, 2003) 
11. Major risks exist  
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Despite this seemingly endless argumentation between Republicans and Democrats, 
cities, states, Congress and the Department of Homeland Security, everyone is aware that 
major threats exist and the U. S. has vulnerabilities. For example, Ceci Connolly (2003) 
reports that  the nation's public health laboratories are "dangerously unprepared" for a 
chemical attack, according to a state-by-state analysis released yesterday and the vast 
majority of labs do not have the equipment or expertise to identify a wide range of 
potential chemical weapons, including ricin, cyanide, sarin, VX and most pesticides, the 
nonprofit, nonpartisan Trust for America's Health reported. "This is a huge area of 
vulnerability," said Shelley Hearne, the group's executive director. "There has not been 
an aggressive response to fill this gap."  Connolly adds that nearly 18 months ago, the 
Department of Health and Human Services identified chemical testing as one of seven 
priorities for state health departments. But little progress has been made, officials 
concede, in large measure because bioterrorism projects overshadowed all other 
preparedness work.  
"If we have to respond to a chemical terrorism event, it will be a train wreck," said Scott 
Becker, executive director of the Association of Public Health Laboratories. "We don't 
have a national plan or testing methods or a lead agency for many of the laboratory 
activities that will be needed when a crisis occurs."  
Connolly notes that not a single state lab has the capability to test for many of the most 
common -- and most hazardous -- chemicals, such as phosgene, a poison that can cause 
severe lung damage, and arsine, a gas that when inhaled can lead to permanent organ 
damage and death. Only two states, Georgia and Iowa, have the equipment and expertise 
to test for cyanide, although the highly toxic compound is commercially available or 
naturally found in 41 states. Only eight states have drafted plans for responding to a 
chemical attack. HHS and the Environmental Protection Agency have yet to resolve a 
dispute over which department has ultimate responsibility for chemical testing.  
"We know we need to develop this capacity," said Joseph Henderson, associate director 
for bioterrorism at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. "It's just not that 
simple."  
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He said that the proper lab equipment is expensive and that chemical testing requires 
extensive training. This year, the CDC intends to allow states to use portions of their 
federal grants for chemical lab expansion if they choose.  
The ability to rapidly detect and identify chemical agents in an emergency "can mean the 
difference between life and death," the report noted, citing the intentional gassing of 
hostages in a Moscow theater in 2002. As victims flooded into the hospitals, physicians 
with no information about the nature of the substance had difficulty treating them.  
Unlike the explosion of a bomb, chemical warfare can be surreptitious. Many of the 60 
chemical agents on the CDC threat list are invisible, odorless and can take hours or days 
to cause harm warns Connolly.  
12. The relationship between DHS and DOD is not necessarily complementary. HS 
can diminish DOD capabilities, v-a-v National Guard.  The US defense posture has been 
built for the last 50 years with the Reserves and the National Guard fulfilling specific 
roles. In the last decade with the downsizing of DOD, this relationship has become more 
important. DOD depends on Guard and Reserve troops to flesh out both combat and 
support needs. Conversely, the Guard particularly has had an important role in helping 
with various state disaster remediations. In general, local fire and rescue and police who 
are going to be on the scene of a chemical or conventional attack first. The National 
Guard may come in later to manage an emergency situation if a city has been largely 
destroyed. O’Hanlon says: “I don't think we want to take the National Guard or Reserve 
in general out of the overseas defense mission, but I think that many of the combat 
brigades and divisions of the current National Guard are not really all that important for 
the overseas warfighting plan ...Again I don't think it means buying top tier, biological 
weapons protection capability for all 300,000 people in the National Guard. That's the 
kind of expenditure that I would not support. But if what it means is that some of the 
training may be another day a year at the margin, goes into this kind of mission, or if you 
think about where you base these people as you downsize, you make sure that you keep a 
certain geographic distribution so you have rapid response capability to the extent 
possible, those sorts of relatively modest but still important considerations may enter in.” 
(O’Hanlon, 2002)  
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 News reports of November 5th 2003 said that Guard and Reserve units in Iraq did not 
have kevlar vests and that their humvees had plastic doors, insufficient to protect troops 
in a combat zone. It is clear that if Guard and Reserve are going to be part of the A team, 
they need to have A team equipment. While this section has examined the challenges at 
hand to suggest that this is a difficulty business, DHS has already taken important steps. 
 
XII. Significant Progress Made  
 
Bruce Carnes, the DHS' chief financial officer (CFO) indicated that DHS had made 
substantial progress in the last year. He stated that DHS was consolidating bank card 
programs from 27 to three; creating a review board to evaluate acquisitions above $ 5 
million; initiating a five-year budget and planning program, and establishing a budget 
process modeled on the Defense Department's Program Objectives Memorandum. These 
are all significant and laudable steps forward.  
 
Carnes elaborated on these issues before the Select House Committee on Homeland 
Security on October 8 2003, “In March 2003, we successfully transferred more than $50 
billion in assets, $36 billion in liabilities, and more than 180,000 employees to the 
Department. Within a few weeks, we created the financial structures and support systems 
necessary to support these transfers. This was accomplished with only handful of staff -- 
a remarkable achievement of which we are proud.  
 
”We have also launched a consolidated bankcard program that will reduce the number of 
programs within the Department from 27 to three, created an investment review board to 
evaluate acquisitions above $5 million, initiated a five-year budget and planning 
program, established a budget process modeled after the Department of Defense's 
Program Objectives Memorandum process, launched a consolidated business and 
financial management systems program, and created a Program Analysis and Evaluation 
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organization charged with leading the Department's program evaluation effort and 
ensuring compliance with performance and accountability requirements.”8 
 
 Carnes indicated the some of the complexity in bringing together elements from so many 
separate departments, saying, “Currently, the Department has 22 disparate financial 
processes. Several of these were established through memorandums of understanding 
with the Department's legacy agencies. Using these processes helped ensure sufficient 
financial support services were available when the Department was first established. 
However, they are labor- intensive and cumbersome to manage. Beginning October 1, 
2003, we consolidated the number of processes from 22 to 10 - primarily by terminating 
the memorandums of understanding with legacy agencies and by shifting the workload to 
in-house financial support service units.  
 
This is only a good start. In FY 2004, we will consider options to further streamline the 
financial processes used by the Department with the goal of enhancing efficiency, 
reducing costs, and improving the quality of financial data.” 
 
Multiple and Redundant Financial Systems were other obstacles that had to be overcome. 
Carnes noted that the Department has 83 financial management systems, few of which 
were integrated. Some were outdated, lacked functionality, and were expensive to operate 
and maintain. J. Richard Berman of the DHS inspector general's office observed that the 
department had inherited "18 material weaknesses" from the 22 agencies that combined 
to form the DHS. Those weaknesses included a lack of policies and procedures to 
effectively monitor contractor costs and performance at the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), leaving TSA "vulnerable to inflated labor rates and other 
inappropriate charges (Doyle, 2003)." To tackle problems such as these, DHS launched 
an aggressive program to transform the Department's business and financial management 
policies, processes, and systems. Carnes noted: 
 
                                                 
8 All of the testimony provided by Bruce Carnes in this section is from that given to the Select House 
Committee on Homeland Security on October 8th, 2003. 
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 “One of the first actions I took as the Department's Chief Financial Officer was to 
establish a Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) Office and to recruit a highly 
experienced director to the lead organization. PA&E's primary responsibilities include: 
designing and managing the Department's Planning, Programming and Budgeting 
System; managing the development of the Future Years Homeland Security Program; 
coordinating the development of the Department's strategic plan; ensuring the 
Department meets performance-based budgeting requirements; managing the 
Department's Investment Review Process; and preparing the Department's Annual 
Performance Plan and the program and performance section of the annual Performance 
and Accountability Report.”(Carnes, 2003).  
 
Carnes added that the PPB system was being modeled after the Department of Defense's 
system and will include as an integral component guidance for establishing goals and 
performance measures which reflect program missions and assess desired outcomes. The 
PPBS will be the basis for developing the Department's first Future Years Homeland 
Security Program, which will be submitted to Congress in accordance with the provisions 
of the Homeland Security Act. Strategic Plan: “We have made substantial progress on the 
Department's first strategic plan and expect to transmit a draft to Congress for review in 
early November. In the area of investment review, since May 2003, our Investment 
Review Board has evaluated approximately ten percent of the Department's major 
acquisitions (over $50 million) and will increase its efforts over the coming months. 
Under the leadership of the Deputy Secretary, the Department launched a comprehensive 
effort to develop measures of effectiveness to help assess performance and make more 
informed resource allocation and budget decisions. Finally, we are on track to issue on 
time the Department's first Annual Performance Plan, which will include rigorous 
performance measures for each of the Department's organizational elements. We will also 
publish the Department's first Performance and Accountability Report in January 2004.” 
In relation to CFO Act: Carnes said that the Department complied with the provisions of 




XIII. Lessons learned from DOD PPB 
 
In the fall of 2002 it was not clear what kind of a budget process DHS would have. 
Subsequently DHS has chosen a PPB process (See appendix A). Based on DOD's 40 year 
history with PPB, we can suggest that it is: 
1. A people and time intensive system 
2. Good on planning 
3. A system at cross-purposes with way Congress appropriates dollars, thus the outcomes 
of the PPB process need to be translated into appropriation formats. 
 4. A system dominated by personnel and procurement of weapons. Personnel levels have 
been set by external events for a long time. There is a top line number for personnel and 
the defense budget does not get into the routine budgetary game of asking for more 
people; it does actively manage its personnel category to hit accession and retention goals 
and this is often connected to resources for items such as bonuses and improved medical 
care. DOD basically has had a top boundary for personnel. This boundary has been both a 
ceiling and a floor, can not go beyond, but can fill up to, stay above...thus it is also a 
guarantee of positions. DHS will probably have no such boundary. In procurement, DOD 
spends a significant portion of budget on R&DTE. As terrorists figure out new ways to 
attack US, DHS probably will spend lots on R&D. What the correct percentage is for this 
category is unknowable. Casual empiricism suggests that the percentage has to be high 
enough to stay just ahead one’s opponent, but not be so lavish that many systems are 
started, but few are finished. Navy or that the final inventory is so rich that it can not be 
afforded. Historically this has averaged around 13% for defense. HS procurement may 
not be cheap particularly in the chem/bio detection and monitoring areas. The expense 
will be compounded by decisions about where equipment is needed. DHS will also need 
to be able to give advice to state and local governments about what off-the-shelf 
technology to buy, so that some interoperability is maintained and so states and local 
governments get the most for their money. Buying systems in DOD is heavily political 
because of geographic distribution of suppliers. Congress likes to play in this game. This 
will probably not be a factor in the early days of DHS, particularly for currently available 
technology as one must buy technology where technology exits. However, Congressmen 
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could well besiege DHS and appropriators and to include updated (and expensive) 
equipment for their state or district, arguing that any particular spot may be the weak link 
that brings on calamity. 
 5. Planning and programming thoughts: DOD gets input to planning process from stable 
set of actors, intelligence sources DIA, CIA, national military strategy, State Department, 
treaties, behavior of allies. National Security leads into National Military Strategy for 
DOD. These elements are either not in place for DHS or not clearly articulated. SECDEF 
issues Defense Planning Guidance on an annual basis (up to 2002) to guide preparation of 
the defense budget, but this may be seen as a marginal adjustment to threat guidance 
combined with a fiscal appraisal for the budget year (match inflation, inflation plus, less 
than inflation, total increase of x%). The critical documents are the national security 
strategy and the National military strategy....who will develop them and who has the 
responsibility and capacity to budget for them. For DHS, the relationship to state and 
local governments, where impact of events may have first occurrence is important, but 
how to put this into budget process is difficult, including such questions as what should 
be the relative shares in programs, what is the unmet need, in which programs should 
DHS lead, in which follow, and when it is a leader, what does it contribute: money, 
advice, criticism, intelligence, hectoring, legal mandates. When it follows, what should it 
contribute: money for supporting functions, e.g. planning and analysis? How should it 
judge local dollar needs as adequate or too abundant, given that localities will chose to 
provide different levels of local DHS and that localities even when they do their best may 
under provide DHS because they do not have fiscal  wherewithal? Should DHS make up 
for local financial disparities, and if so to what extent and how...e.g. earmarked money 
for functions, general grants, matching grants. In defense, treaties have the force of law, 
but how will relationships to state and local governments be structured? Will DHS be a 
steady provider of dollars or will funds fall out of the sky on a seemingly random basis as 
needs that have been there all along are suddenly discovered.  
 
Programming buys force structure...describes the who, what, why and when of a function. 
Budgeting in this system tends to be a pricing and timing for the budget year function. 
Programming maintains the FYDP; budgeting buys the FYDP for the current year. 
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Programming works better when centralized, but centralization risks failing to integrate 
the needs of field functions. Programming must also be done in time to guide the 
budgetmakers. This is not as easy as it sounds. Nonetheless, recent experience with the 
DOD PPB experience has proven its value. With the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of 
the Cold war, DOD needed a new threat synthesis. Eventually this was produced, focused 
around a base force concept. While some of this thinking was done outside the PPB 
process, much was done inside and the outcomes helped shape US military posture from 
1991 through 2001. The PPB mechanism kept this vision constant in the planning and 
budgeting process. Thus military leaders had guidance about what had to be done. The 
base force concept suggested that the Cold war world was gone and now the world would 
be more complex as bi-polar rigidity turned to multi-polar complexity; predictability 
turned to uncertainty; communism gave way to ethnic/religious conflicts; fixed alliances 
gave way to ad hoc coalitions/alliances; known adversaries were replaced by ambiguous 
threats, and based on the first Iraq war, an inactive UN would be replaced by an Active 
UN.  The risk of conflict would be higher, the level of conflict smaller scale, weapons 
technology would favor high tech systems; US forward presence would be high; roles 
and functions would be joint, and fiscal expectations were for a decreasing budget. 
Generally, all of these conditions came to pass, although in different ways. This base 
force concept saw the military reduced by about one-third and budgets reduced or flat 
until about 1998. Obvious costly missions were financed by supplemental bills. The base 
force concept led to a series of planning documents for each military department. The 
Navy’s document stressed such concepts as manning the reduced force with high quality, 
well-trained personnel, jointness, and maintaining readiness. These principals held up 
during the decade of the 1990’s.  Since HS is basically a threat-based budget, a PPB 




Getting along with Congress 
When the focus changes to Congress, it becomes clear that budgeting is a shared power, 
between the executive and legislative branches: the executive proposes, and Congress 
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disposes. Based on aggregate analysis, Congress appears to make marginal changes. It 
may change 5% of a budget, but if your program is in that 5%, an incremental change in 
general may be a quantum change in particular. In defense, the threat drives the budget. 
The maxim for DOD leaders is “You fight the force someone else built and you buy the 
force someone else will fight.” They believe that Defense is a multiyear stream of 
resources and commitments where resources are constrained and their job is to maintain 
the shape and effectiveness of the force over time, notwithstanding budget hits in any one 
year. DHS will be like and unlike defense: like in threat based scenario, complex, 
asynchronous, driven by individuals and groups representing a viewpoint but not a state, 
supported by terrorist states: threat visibility may be less clear, until it happens; who to 
punish may be difficult to see and even if seen, convincing others to take action may be 
difficult. Era of pre-emptive war: Afghanistan, battle against a group; Iraq, battle against 
a state. Going forward road may be less clear. Defense budget built on a “deter or win” 
basis; a good budget allows you to win, a better budget deters the other state, but maybe 
not in a world of terrorists.  
Inevitably, some part of the homeland security budget is going to consist of money given 
to state and local governments; how to distribute this is going to be a problem and  
arguments are going to arise about this because differences in need, and equity is going to 
be hard to define. While the economy is slowing absorbing the collapse of the NASDAQ 
bubble, state finances are in flux. For example, California is facing a 30% revenue gap on 
its general fund. In 2002 some 40 states also faced substantial deficits. The metrics of 
state and local budgets tend to mean that after libraries and parks are cut, and ‘frills’ 
trimmed out of the education and welfare programs it is only the hard core health, 
welfare, education and police and fire, the first responders in HS that remain. In this 
scenario, there is a very real possibility that new money to states may not increase 
amount of homeland security, as states, knowing they are going to get HS dollars, 
underprovide current dollars for HS, giving them to education, for example, and counting 
on federal dollars to make up the difference to bring HS programs back to the level they 
were at previously, or less. As a result, the true need for HS may be underprovided. It is 
also inevitable that different states will provide different models of homeland security. 
Location, population characteristics and perceived vulnerabilities probably mean that 
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Iowa will administer programs and dollars differently than California, Des Moines 
differently than San Francisco. Different needs compromised by tendency to do equitable 
sharing of money, thus for the federal government there is a tension between fair share 
where everybody gets something vs most at risk get all. What the metric is going to be is 
unclear, other than that everyone will get something and some may get a lot more. The 
executive branch is likely to prioritize in order of who needs it worst, while Congress is 
likely to favor an approach where everyone gets something, with some few getting more 
than others. 
 
Comparisons: DHS and Defense Budgeting 
They are threat driven budgets, but the threats are different. DHS may be more complex 
in that civilian populations are threatened with destruction for no reasonable end. 
Elements within both budgets can use traditional budgeting methodologies like price 
changes and workload drivers, (Defense Logistics Agency in DOD; Customs, INS in 
DHS), but the real driver is the threat. However, the threat is amorphous. For DOD, the 
threat was fairly clear from 1948 – 1989 with Cold War paradigm, but even so that 
resulted in tangential hot wars, some of which might not have been as closely related to 
the main threat as it seemed at the time. Now DOD threat is smaller scale, but ambiguous 
and asymmetrical. DHS threat is small scale compared to nuclear war, but events that are 
nationally small scale could have disastrous and wide-spread impacts on localities and 
regions, e.g. bombing a nuclear power plant and spreading radioactivity, destruction of 
Golden Gate Bridge, anthrax in the post office or poison in a water system. All are 
possible threats. Boundary between DOD and DHS is external vs internal, but each has 
an interest in the other’s domain and information and task co-ordination will be 
important, e.g. in the cases of the Coast Guard (Homeland Protector but a part of sea-
power in wartime) and National Guard and Reserves, commonly used in domestic 
emergencies but integral to the Iraq deployment in this era of a downsized military. 
Managing the border between DOD and DHS will be important. 
No one can say how much money is enough in these areas. 
Both can make legitimate claims to be underfunded. DOD has a procurement gap 
(recapitalization) for ships and planes that still exists, but lacking an enemy proficient in 
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modern ships and planes, there is little likelihood that DOD will be given the money to 
recapitalize. DHS is underfunded in two different ways. At the federal level, DHS 
appears to have been understaffed when it was created, at least from newspaper reports, 
and some employees chose not to transfer to DHS when they had a chance because there 
was less job risk in their old department, thus some DHS elements started out smaller 
than planned. DHS also underfunded because many of the first responders are at the local 
level and there is no national standard for preparedness in training and equipment and 
because opinions differ as to what formula should be used to apportion money that goes 
to localities, e.g. people to protect, miles of border to guard, salient national targets in 
jurisdiction, e.g. Three Mile Island, Brooklyn Bridge etc. 
In both areas there is an assumption that some risk will have to be chanced.  
In both DOD and DHS, good intelligence correctly interpreted and decisively 
implemented will be critical to success, perhaps more critical than having the perfect 
suite of tools at hand. Timely intelligence information (INTEL) allows the luxury of 
choosing various means of defeating the enemy. It is highly likely that INTEL funding 
will be under-provided because it too is an amorphous good, until something goes wrong. 
Moreover, both DOD and DHS split intel gathering and interpreting with other 
organizations, thus even if total spent is enough, coordination and command and control 
of disparate organizations “tax” the intel function and less is provided than could be. 
Moreover, the danger exists that what is decisive and actionable intel to one party in the 
system may be treated as “noise” by another. While there seems to be a common sense 
case for spending for intel, in practice it is a hard sell. 
DOD was not set up in a day. Despite Truman’s concept of a national defense 
department, an intelligence function and a national security advisory body, what we now 
see as DOD, CIA, and NSC, these did not spring full blown into being. A powerful 
President with a clear concept in mind acting at the close of a successful war could not 
pull these together. It took some time and two laws to accomplish. By the time it was 
finally set up, the Iron Curtain had descended and the U. S. was involved with Korea. 
The lesson for DHS is that too may take some time to get right. It is also worth noting 
that fine-tuning the organizational patterns did not prevent the U. S. from meeting the 
challenges that were thrust upon us, e.g. creation of the Marshall plan and responding in 
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Korea. DHS advocates ought not to worry that they need to get organization right. The 
defense budget system that seems so familiar now, did not spring fully articulated into 
being with the creation of the department, not in 1947, nor 1949. In fact, the actual 
system was fully articulated with McNamara in the 1960’s, more than a decade after the 
creation of DOD and substantially amended by Goldwater-Nichols in 1986. 
 
XIV. Advice in Going Forward 
 
When this research was begun, the shape of the DHS budget function was unclear, but in 
the last year the Department of Homeland Security has taken giant steps. The first step 
was taken by creating and filling the position of CFO, pursuant to the CFO Act of 1990. 
The new CFO, Bruce Carnes, then took a major step. He established an office of Program 
Analysis and Evaluation and filled it with a highly capable and experienced Director, 
Richard Williams. Under his direction PA&E will design and manage DHS’s PPB system 
and design and manage DHS’s Future Years Homeland Security Program, the single 
database that captures plans and fiscal desires for five to seven years in the future. PA&E 
will also manage DHS’s responses to strategic planning as called for by the GPRA of 
1994 as implemented by OMB. DHS’s first strategic plan was to be submitted to 
Congress in November of 2003. (Carnes, 2003)  
These are important and good first steps. It seems to us that DHS is on the right track to 
fulfill its budgetary mission. We would like to offer some additional behavioral 
suggestions, based on some decades of research in defense and non-defense budgeting. 
1. Remember incrementalism: as an outcome and as a decision strategy; use rational tools 
and procedures, but remember the value of incremental patterns: they keep what is good 
about the present solution. Many year to year routines in PPB are incremental. 
 
2. Remember roles: reviewers cut; agencies are aggressors....whenever someone gets too 
far away from the mean (trend line), the next reviewer will probably limit the distance 
(by cutting or adding)...whichever reverts toward the mean. 
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3. Do the right thing: ask for what is necessary: don’t settle for less, don’t be afraid to be 
aggressive when it is warranted just because you know the outcome may be incremental 
 
4. Be careful of non-starters: It is OK to raise consciousness, but first you have to work 
the issue, talk it around. If you introduce big changes cold; you will almost certainly lose 
and if it is seen as a wild idea, it might undermine others’ trust in you and hence threaten 
other parts of your budget. Numbers 3 and 4 are somewhat contradictory. 
 
5. Remember the budget is a stream of resources and can take a hit in any one year; yet 
players have to avoid being zeroed out or taken off the table (taken out of the future 
years’ defense plan (FYDP) in year three with a promise to be put it back in the FYDP in 
year five. This probably won’t happen and your program will be competing will all those 
other programs that did not make it into the budget. 
 
6. Remember that much analysis has multi-year patterns...this year, last year, over the 
duration of the future years’ homeland security plan (FYHSP). Lowest year in a five year 
profile may be used as base point because you survived and nothing appeared to be hurt. 
Thus when cuts hurt, you need to show the pain. Defense does this by stopping 
something that really matters, e.g. flying aircraft or steaming ships. DOD is permeated by 
a ‘can do attitude, but this is probably not a good budget strategy. Miracles can be 
accomplished in the short run without much in the way of funding, but continued 
commitment takes money. Moreover, if the personnel or equipment base is low, money 
might be necessary right from the start. Many of DHS’s bureaus were paper processors, 
customs, INS, and their first response might be to process more paper, which could be 
directly contrary to what might need to be done. 
 
7. Be nimble, but careful. When the threat changes, upsize quickly, but downsize 
carefully. Err on the side of safety: in 1990, some people said that DOD planners should 
look to where DOD was likely to be in 1998 and cut to fit that model in 1990, (from 17 to 
12 aircraft carriers, for example) and use the excess funds accumulated as these vertical 
cuts were made to fix things that DOD would not have funds for in 1998 e. g. pier 
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maintenance, renovation. This seems like a smart idea, but it was not one which took 
hold. This was an argument for vertical cuts, but decision-makers tend to prefer 
horizontal cuts, perhaps because it preserves options.  
 
8. Representation vs misrepresentation: everyone has a representational task. Needs, 
wants, and wishes are a good way to think about it. When you begin to argue to loudly 
for wishes, you enter the misrepresentation zone. 
 
9. Do not be over-impressed by business logic. Government is not a business and good 
business patterns do not necessarily transfer or translate into good government patterns. 
Much of what is awkward about government has to do with checks and balances, and 
producing effective programs with due process procedures that support equality of 
treatment before the law. Much of the intrusiveness and seeming over-control of 
Congress is just Congress doing its rightful job. Some is not; some is indeed unnecessary 
oversight, just as some government financial management practices lead to inefficiency, 
misuse, and waste. 
 
10. There is no one rule which encompasses all situations. Follow patterns which have 
worked before, and when new situations arise, try to think them through in respect to best 
responses. Depart slowly from the tried and true, but do depart when it is appropriate.  
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 Appendix A: Highlights of Proposal 
February 4, 2002  
The President's Plan to Strengthen Our Homeland Security  
• $3.5 billion, a 1,000-percent increase -- for the nation’s “first responders” – our police, 
firefighters and Emergency Medical Teams.  
• $11 billion for border security, a $2 billion increase.  
• Nearly $6 billion to defend against bioterrorism.  
• $700 million to improve intelligence-gathering and information-sharing between agencies 
and throughout all levels of government.  
• $230 million to create Citizen Corps to help your community be better prepared for a 
terrorist attack.  
 The President's budget nearly doubles funding for a sustained strategy of homeland 
security, focused on four key areas: bioterrorism, emergency response, airport and 
border security, and improved intelligence. We will develop vaccines to fight anthrax and 
other deadly diseases. We'll increase funding to help states and communities train and 
equip our heroic police and firefighters. We will improve intelligence collection and 
sharing, expand patrols at our borders, strengthen the security of air travel, and use 
technology to track the arrivals and departures of visitors to the United States.  
The President's Plan  
 $3.5 billion, a 1,000-percent increase -- for the nation’s “first responders.” These are the 
police officers, firefighters and medical personnel who risk their lives every day defending 
our homeland -- and who gave their lives on 9/11. The funding will help pay for new 
equipment, training and overtime costs, based on what states, cities and counties agree 
they need in order to implement their anti-terrorism plan.  
 $11 billion for border security, a $2 billion increase. This includes a significant increase 
for the Coast Guard and the U.S. Customs Service, to keep unwanted goods – including 
drugs -- from coming into the U.S. by land, sea or air. And it includes funding for the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service to develop a new entry-exit visa database and 
tracking system.  
 Nearly $6 billion to defend against bioterrorism. This will help hospitals become better 
able to respond to a bioterror emergency; boost research and development of new 
vaccines, medicines and diagnostic tests; and build up our critical National 
Pharmaceutical Stockpile.  
 $700 million to improve intelligence-gathering and information-sharing. This money will 
not only help federal agencies share information with each other, but develop ways that 
we can share information with states and cities so they can better determine how to use 
their resources.  
 $230 million to create Citizen Corps. A variety of programs to engage ordinary Americans 
in specific homeland security efforts in their own communities. Initiatives include the 
creation of a Medical Reserve Corps, a Volunteers in Police Service (VIPS) program and 
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a Terrorist Information and Prevention System (TIPS) – as well as a doubling of the 
Neighborhood Watch program, and a tripling of the Community Emergency Response 
Team (CERT) program.  
 
2. President Signs Appropriation for FY2004 
President Bush Signs Homeland Security Appropriations Bill  
Remarks by the President on Signing Homeland Security Appropriations Act 
Department of Homeland Security 
Washington, D.C. October 1, 2003 
       
2:07 P.M. EDT  
\On September the 11th, 2001, enemies of freedom made our country a battleground. Their 
method is the mass murder of the innocent, and their goal is to make all Americans live in fear. 
Yet our nation refuses to live in fear. And the best way to overcome fear and to frustrate the plans 
of our enemies is to be prepared and resolute at home, and to take the offensive abroad. The 
danger to America gives all of you an essential role in the war on terror. You've done fine work 
under difficult and urgent circumstances, and on behalf of a grateful nation, I thank you all for 
what you do for the security and safety of our fellow citizens.  
I appreciate Tom Ridge agreeing to lead this important department. I'm honored to call him friend, 
and I'm proud of the job he is doing. I appreciate General John Gordon, who is the Homeland 
Security Advisor in the White House. I want to thank the very capable Department of Homeland 
Security leadership who are with us today.  
I'm also honored to share this bill signing with members of the United States Senate and the 
United States House of Representative who did an excellent job of getting this bill through. I 
appreciate so very much the Senator from Mississippi, Thad Cochran, the Chairman of the 
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security. I'm also honored that three 
members of the House are up here to join in the bill signing ceremony, starting with the Chairman 
of the House Appropriations Committee, Bill Young of Florida; Hal Rogers of Kentucky, the 
Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security; Congressman 
Martin Sabo from Minnesota, the ranking member of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security. I want to thank you all for a job 
well-done. (Applause.)  
I'm also so pleased that members in the Senate and 
the House of both political parties are with us today. 
The stage wasn't big enough to hold you. Thank you 
for coming. Thanks for your hard work, and thanks for 
working together to do what's right for America.  
This time two years ago, America was still in the midst 
of a national emergency. Smoke was rising from 
Ground Zero; recovery teams were carefully sifting 
through debris; and chaplains were comforting 
families and blessing the dead. Our nation does not live in the past; yet we do not forget the past 
and the grief of that time. We do not forget the men and women and children who were lost that 
day. We do not forget the enemies who rejoiced as America suffered, or those who seek to inflict 
more pain and grief on our country.  
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On September the 11th, America accepted a great mission, and that mission continues to this 
hour. We will do everything in our power to prevent another attack on the American people. And 
wherever America's enemies plot and plan, we'll find them, and we will bring them to justice. 
(Applause.)  
The war on terror has set urgent priorities for America abroad. We are not waiting while dangers 
gather. Along with fine allies, we are waging a global campaign against terrorist networks -- 
disrupting their operations, cutting off their funding, and we are hunting down their leaders one-
by-one. We are enforcing a clear doctrine: If you harbor a terrorist, if you feed a terrorist, if you 
support a terrorist, you're just as guilty as the terrorists, and you can expect to share their fate.  
We're determined to prevent terror networks from gaining weapons of mass destruction. We're 
committed to spreading democracy and tolerance. As we hunt down the terrorists, we're 
committed to spending -- spreading freedom in all parts of the world, including the Middle East. 
By removing the tyrants in Iraq and Afghanistan who supported terror and by ending the 
hopelessness that feeds terror, we're helping the people of that regime, and we're strengthening 
the security of America.  
The war on terror has also set urgent priorities here at home. Oceans no longer protect us from 
danger. And we're taking unprecedented measures to prevent terrorist attacks, reduce our 
vulnerabilities and to prepare for any emergency. That's what you're doing.  
Each of you plays a vital role in this strategy to better secure America. Agencies that once worked 
separately to safeguard our country are now working together in a single department, and that's 
good for America. You've the authority to quickly put the right people in place as we respond to 
danger. You've got good leadership. Every member of this department has an important calling, 
and you need to know, when you come to work every day, your fellow citizens are counting on 
you.  
Those in Customs and Immigration are performing essential work in controlling our borders, and 
at the same time, in reducing the backlog of immigrant applicants as we move toward a standard 
of six-month processing time for all applications.  
At the Transportation Security Administration and the Coast Guard, you protect the vast road, rail 
and sea and air networks that are critical to the American economy. DHS scientists and 
engineers work to detect deadly chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. DHS experts help the 
public and private sectors to identify and address vulnerabilities in our power grids, chemical 
plants, communications systems and transportation networks. At FEMA, you joined forces with 
state and local authorities to respond quickly and effectively to any emergency.  
All of you have been given a hard job, and you're rising to the challenge. The American people 
understand the importance of your work, and so does the United States Congress. The 
Homeland Security bill I will sign today commits $31 billion to securing our nation, over $14 billion 
more than pre-September 11th levels. The bill increases funding for the key responsibilities at the 
Department of Homeland Security and supports important new initiatives across the Department.  
We're providing $5.6 billion over the next decade to fund Project BioShield. Under this program, 
DHS will work with the Department of Health and Human Services to accelerate the development 
and procurement of advanced vaccines and treatments to protect Americans against biological, 
or chemical, or radiological threats.  
We're providing $4 billion in grants for our nation's first responders. We're focusing $725 million 
on major urban areas where it is most needed. We're also providing $40 million for Citizen Corps 
Councils through which volunteers work with first responders to prepare their communities for 
emergencies. We're ensuring that America's firefighters and police officers and emergency 
medical personnel have the best possible training and equipment and help they need to do their 
job.  
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We're better securing our borders and transportation systems while facilitating the flow of 
legitimate commerce. Our Container Security Initiative will allow for the screening of high-risk 
cargo at the world's largest ports and intercept dangerous materials before they reach our shores; 
supporting the efforts to strengthen our air cargo security system for passenger aircraft; to 
expand research on cargo screening technologies.  
We're making sure the Coast Guard has the resources to deploy additional maritime safety and 
security teams, and patrol boats, and sea marshals to protect our ports and waterways.  
More than $900 million in this bill will go to science and technology projects, including a major 
effort to anticipate and counter the use of biological weapons. With more than $800 million, we 
will assess the vulnerabilities in our critical infrastructures, we'll take action to protect them.  
We're doing a lot here. And we're expecting a lot of you. When the terrorist enemies came into 
our country and took thousands of innocent lives, we made a decision in this country: We will not 
wait for enemies to strike again. We'll take action to stop them. We're not going to stand by while 
terrorists and their state sponsors plot, plan and grow in strength. By the actions that we continue 
to take abroad, we are going to remove grave threats to America and the world. History has given 
us that charge, and that is a charge we will keep. (Applause.)  
We have been charged to protect our homeland, as well. And that's why we're taking actions to 
strengthen our defenses and to make our nation more secure. This bill is a major step forward in 
our ongoing effort, and I'm pleased to sign into law the Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act of 2004.  
3. FY 2004 Budget Fact Sheet (HR2555, conference report HR 108-280, Public Law 
108-90, signed on 10/01/03  
Today President Bush signed the first ever homeland security appropriations bill at the 
Department of Homeland Security, continuing his commitment to protect the American people. 
Overall, the Department's FY 2004 budget authority totals $37.6 billion: $30.4 billion provided by 
the Congress plus an additional $7.2 billion in fees.  
Below are some highlights:  
Aviation Security 
•        Of nearly $4.6 billion in Transportation Security Administration (TSA) funding, specific 
programs include:  
   ·           $150 million to purchase explosives detection systems. 
   ·           $250 million to install these systems in airports.  
•        Another $85 million is allocated to improve air cargo security, including:   
   ·           $30 million to enable TSA to improve its oversight of the known shipper program, using 
a risk-weighted freight screening system that will identify pieces of cargo that require closer 
scrutiny before being loaded on passenger aircraft. Funds will also enable TSA to hire an 
additional 100 staff to perform more in-depth audits of shipper compliance with the known shipper 
requirement.  
   ·           $55 million to be used by TSA’s Research and Development to pursue a variety of 
technological solutions that would allow for the most efficient and targeted inspections of cargo 
carried on passenger aircraft. 
Port Security 
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•        $14 million for the “Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)” that will more 
than double the number of the Department’s partnerships with foreign manufacturers and 
importers.  These partners agree to meet “supply chain” standards ensuring that their shipment 
methods repel potential terrorist attempts to use those shipments for introducing weapons of 
mass destruction into our ports.  
   ·           C-TPAT will add nearly 160 more supply chain security experts to provide training and 
technical assistance to those partners, who will benefit from the increased level of trust by 
experiencing fewer port inspections and shorter wait times. 
•        $62 million for the Container Security Initiative (CSI), to deploy teams of inspectors, special 
agents, and intelligence analysts to 20 foreign “mega-ports” and approximately 10 other strategic 
ports to inspect containerized cargo for weapons of mass destruction before it is ever shipped to 
the United States.  
•        $64 million will support technology for non-intrusive inspection (NII).  This will add to a 
variety of port inspection assets supported from prior year funding, including radiation detection 
systems, large scale x-ray machines for trucks and oceangoing shipping containers, mobile 
vehicle and cargo inspection systems (VACIS), and isotope identifiers for international mail and 
express courier hubs.  The advantage to importers whose cargo warrants increased inspection 
will be more efficient, timely, and less costly inspections than the alternative of physical removal 
of cargo from a conveyance.  
•        $125 million for port security grants that fund security planning and projects to improve 
dockside and perimeter security at the nation’s ports.  These funds represent the latest round of 
grants awarded to state and local governments and private companies that contribute to 
important security upgrades like new patrol boats in the harbor, surveillance equipment at roads 
and bridges, and the construction of new command and control facilities.     
Border Security and Immigration Enforcement 
•        $41 million for up to 570 additional Border Patrol Agents.  
•        $35.2 million for an air surveillance wing on the Northern Border, of which $12.8 million is 
for the purchase of aircraft.  
•        $6.7 million for 51 more Special Agents in the Compliance Enforcement Office of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s  (ICE) Office of Investigations.  These agents will follow 
up on “overstays” identified by the US VISIT, SEVIS and NSEERS databases.  
US VISIT 
•        $330 million is provided for the US Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US 
VISIT) project under the direct control of the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation 
Security.  This system will provide the capability to record the entry and exit of non-US citizens 
into and out of the US, and provide officials with information about persons who are in the US in 
violation of the terms of their admission to the US.  
Training More Federal Agents 
•        The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center receives $192.78 million, chiefly to provide 
additional student training days to federal law enforcement agents.  
State and Local Funding 
•        $4.037 billion is allocated to the Office for Domestic Preparedness for assistance to our 
nation’s first responders, including:  
   ·           $1.7 billion for formula-based grants of which 80% of the funds made available to the 
state shall be made available to the localities within 60 days of the state receiving the funds. 
   ·           $750 million for Firefighters Assistance Grants.  
   ·           $725 million for discretionary grants for high-threat, high-density urban areas, of which 
80% of the funds made available to the state shall be made available to the localities within 60 
days of the state receiving the funds.  In administering these grants, the Congress has directed 
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the Secretary to take into consideration credible threat, presence of critical infrastructure, 
population, vulnerability, cooperation of multiple jurisdictions in preparing domestic preparedness 
plans, and the identified needs of public agencies when determining the allocation of these funds. 
   ·           $500 million for law enforcement terrorism prevention grants, of which 80% of the funds 
made available to the state, shall be made available to the localities within 60 days of the state 
receiving the fund.  This is a new appropriation not funded in FY 2003. 
   ·           $40 million for Citizen Corps grants. 
Emergency Preparedness 
•        $9.1 billion is provided for Emergency Preparedness and Response, including:  
   ·           $1.8 billion for the Disaster Relief Fund, which provides federal assistance to 
supplement state and local governments’ disaster response, recovery, preparedness and 
mitigation efforts.  With this funding, DHS provides a significant portion of the total Federal 
response to victims in Presidentially-declared major disasters and emergencies.   
   ·           $484 million for Public Health Programs, specifically $400 million for the Strategic 
National Stockpile, $50 million for the Metropolitan Medical Response System and $34 million for 
the National Disaster Medical System.  This activity provides for the countermeasures needed to 
treat diseases caused by critical chemical and biological agents, as well as medical and support 
personnel.   This FY 2004 funding is a $184 million increase over the $300 million funded in 2003. 
   ·           $200 million for the flood map modernization activities. This program uses state-of-the-
art technology to cost-effectively develop accurate and complete flood hazard information 
nationwide.  This capability will enable state and local planners to better identify high risk areas 
susceptible to flood damage.  Using Hurricane Isabel as an example, FEMA, along with state and 
local land planning agencies, could have used this technology to better help identify areas in 
Virginia and North Carolina that are at risk for flood damage.  This information is then used to 
develop a mitigation strategy where the Chesapeake Watershed is managed and improvements 
to coastal lands and structures are made that would have minimized flood damage.  The flood 
map modernization program works in tandem with FEMA’s National Flood Insurance Fund, and 
together helps Americans limit losses in consequence of flood damage every year.  The FY 2004 
budget allocates $51 million more in funds over the $149 million funded in 2003. 
   ·           $180 million for Emergency Management Performance Grants, of which no more than 
3% may be used for administrative expenses.  These grants help reduce the risk of future 
damage in hazard areas and ultimately reduce the need for disaster assistance.  This is an 
increase of $15 million over the $165 million funded in 2003. 
   ·           $153 million for the Emergency Food and Shelter Program, of which no more than 3.5% 
may be used for administrative expenses.  This program is designed to help address the 
problems of hunger and homelessness associated with disasters. 
   ·           $60 million for Urban Search and Rescue Teams, of which no more than 3% may be 
used for administrative expenses.  This provides funding for the operations, equipment and 
training of search and rescue teams. 
   ·           $5.6 billion in advance appropriations for the years FY 2004 to FY 2013 for Project 
Bioshield, of which $890 million is available in FY 2004.  Under this program, DHS will work with 
the Department of Health and Human Services to accelerate the development and procurement 
of advanced vaccines and treatments to protect Americans against biological, chemical, and 
radiological threats. 
Modernizing the U.S. Coast Guard 
•        Of $6.8 billion provided for the Coast Guard,  
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   ·           $668 million is allocated to the Integrated Deepwater System Project, the Coast Guard’s 
multi-year recapitalization that will replace or modernize the Coast Guard’s large ships, aircraft, 
sensors, command and control systems, and logistics system.  Deepwater funding in FY-04 
including $143 million for aircraft, which will include the purchase of a CASA 235 maritime patrol 
aircraft; $303 million to be used in part for construction of the first 420-foot National Security 
Cutter; $101 million for use in part for continued development of  a network-centric command and 
control system that will provide a common operating picture; $24.7 million for a common logistics 
information system; and continued development of the vertical unmanned aerial vehicle that will 
deploy from IDS cutters. 
   ·           The FY 2004 budget provides for 7 additional deployable Maritime Safety and Security 
Teams for a total of 13 teams.  Each team includes 90 people and 6 boats, which provide a 
robust security posture in ports to protect vulnerable assets such as bridges, nuclear power 
plants, passenger vessels, and vessels carrying hazardous cargo. 
   ·           An additional $26.3 million and 529 new personnel increase the Coast Guard’s search 
and rescue capability, and the safety of its people as they perform rescues during storms, floods, 
and darkness.  
Science and Technology 
•        $918.2 million is provided for Science and Technology, including:  
   ·           $88 million for the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center to build a 
facility that will be the DHS “hub and spoke” system that will further the mission of increasing 
understanding of potential bioterrorism pathogens and improving protection of human health and 
agriculture against biological terrorism. 
   ·           $75 million for the Rapid Prototyping Program, to fund counterterrorism projects 
selected through last summer’s and this fall’s Technical Support Working Group solicitations, and 
to support the rapid adaptation of commercial technologies  through the Homeland Security 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) for use by DHS and state and local first 
responders. 
   ·           $70 million for the Homeland Security University Programs.  This program will include 
the Homeland Security Scholars and Fellows program that will provide scholarships to 
undergraduate and graduate students pursuing scientific studies in homeland security.  In 
addition, it will include the Homeland Security Centers of Excellence (HS-Centers) program that 
will establish a coordinated, university-based system to enhance the Nation’s homeland security.  
The HS-Centers will be a critical component of our nation’s defenses by providing a dedicated 
capability that will enhance our ability to anticipate, prevent, respond to, and recover from terrorist 
attacks. 
   ·           $66.5 million for critical infrastructure protection, of which $60 million is provided for the 
research, development, testing and evaluation of an anti-missile device for commercial aircraft. 
   ·           $39 million for developing a database of homeland-security related standards from 
private sector standards development organizations, for certification and accreditation models for 
products and services, for testing and evaluation protocols for commercial radiation detectors, 
and for developing standard chemical methods of analysis of high explosives, chemical warfare 
agents, and toxic industrial chemicals. 
   ·           $38 million will be used to continue the deployment of the Urban Monitoring Program, 
also known as BioWatch.  Through the BioWatch biosurveillance program, DHS, the 
Environmental Protection Agency and the Centers for Disease Control’s Laboratory Response 
Network provide early detection of bio-threats.  These partners are working with state and local 
officials to implement an effective consequence management plan that incorporates the BioWatch 
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system.   In addition, these funds are also being applied to develop the next generation of bio-
pathogen monitoring sensors.  
   ·           $127 million will be used to develop sensors and other countermeasures to prevent the 
illicit transport and use of radiological and nuclear materials within the United States. 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
•        A total of $839.3 million is provided for information analysis and infrastructure protection, 
including:  
   ·                                                                                   
   ·           $20 million for the Departmental Command Center, which provides 24 hour a day, 7 day 
a week live watch for command, control, and monitoring capabilities of the Department. 
   ·           $28 million for threat determination and assessment, which provides strategic 
assessments of our nation’s critical infrastructures and key assets, including 168,000 public water 
systems; 300,000 oil and natural gas production facilities; 4,000 offshore platforms; 278,000 miles 
of natural gas pipelines; 361 seaports; 104 nuclear power plants; 80,000 dams; and tens of 
thousands of other potentially critical targets. 
   ·           $52.3 million for information warnings and advisories, which will develop a 
comprehensive process to guide intelligence collection, assessment, evaluation, and 
prioritization; and ensure the required privacy protection related to the use, collection, and 
disclosure of private sector and personal information. 
   ·           $84.2 million for infrastructure vulnerability and risk assessment, which will develop and 
maintain a complete, accurate, and prioritized mapping of the nation’s critical infrastructures and 
key assets including agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, government, 
defense industrial base, information and telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and 
finance, chemical and hazardous materials, postal and shipping, and monuments and icons. 
   ·           $345 million for remediation and protective actions, which includes work with state and 
local governments, and industry, to identify and prioritize protective measures; and to develop 
objective protection standards and performance measures. 
   ·           $141 million for the National Communications System, which includes the emergency 
notification system, back-up dial-tone, government emergency telecommunications network, and 
wireless priority service. 
Immigration Services 
   ·           The CIS budget includes $1.8 billion, a 9% increase ($143 million) over FY 2003 to 
support further improvements in application processing as well as the processing of projected 
volume.  The $1.8 billion is comprised of $236 million in appropriated funding and approximately 
$1.6 billion in projected fee revenues. 
   ·           The CIS budget supports the President's five-year, $500 million initiative, begun in FY 
2002, to attain a universal six-month processing time standard for all immigration benefit 
applications, and provide quality service to all legal immigrants, citizens, businesses and other 
CIS customers.  The third $100 million installment of the President's five-year plan consists of 




•        $1.14 billion is provided for the Secret Service, which includes new funding for White 
House mail screening.  The bill also supports security enhancements at Secret Service protected 
facilities.   
•        The USSS will be the lead agency for multiple National Special Security Events this year, 
including the G7/G8 meeting and the Republican and Democratic National Conventions and 
protection of presidential candidates during the campaign of 2004.   
•        The bill also supports the Secret Service Electronic Crimes Task Force initiative, promotes 
additional programs to protect our nation’s financial infrastructure, and allows the Secret Service 
to continue to provide grant and forensic support to the National Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children. 
 
PART Performance Reviews 
(Portions of the Department of Homeland Security mission have been subjected to OMB 
scoring through performance based budget reviews by OMB. The excerpt from 
McCaffery and Jones on Defense Budgeting (2004, forthcoming) explains more about the 
PART  scoring sytem and its derivation.) 
In 2002 and 2003, portions of the federal budget were prepared and analyzed using what 
may be termed performance-based budget review to link funding to performance 
measures and accomplishments for federal programs within departments and agencies. 
The approach used by OMB for the FY 2003 President's Budget, the Program 
Assessment Rating Tool or PART, was employed to score performance in approximately 
220 programs (about 20% of total on-budget federal programs) for the President's 
Budget. PART scores programs using multi-variable criteria set of approximately 30 
variables that culminates in what may be characterized as a "stop light" system: red for 
failing performance, yellow for marginal performance, and green for good performance. 
OMB intends to extend the application of PART to all programs in the budget in future 
budget review. If this is done, it will be a time consuming effort. 
 
For FY 2003 many programs received failing scores -- but improvements were measured 
for FY 2004. Departments and agencies have invested staff time and energy into 
achieving improved ratings in attempt to be rewarded in the President's Budget. The key 
incentive supporting the PART system is the intent of OMB directors and staff to 
integrate performance-scoring with OMB budget review. Presumably, programs that 
improve their ratings will be rewarded in the budget. The advantages of the PART 
approach are two-fold. First, the scoring is easy to understand because it is simple -- red, 
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yellow, green -- like the ABC scale used in graduate education (a C isn't a failing grade 
and, likewise, agencies receiving red scores do not suffer budget losses). Second, PART 
scores are scaled relative to a set of variables that represent the strategic and annual 
planning, management and execution performance by programs according to data 
developed and reported to OMB by agencies. OMB does not provide the data for PART 
reviews. 
 
Review of the PART system by departments and agencies that have been rated by OMB 
indicated several recurrent criticisms (Jones, 2003b). The PART questionnaire instrument 
requires yes or no answers to a number of questions about performance. It has been 
suggested that a better system would have departments and agencies rate their answers on 
a scale, e.g., 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest). Scaled data are more amenable to analysis than 
yes/no responses. A second criticism concerned the way OMB defined the units of 
analysis -- as programs instead of departmental or agency administrative entities. Some 
programs defined by OMB were not administered as such by departments and agencies 
(many programs cross agency jurisdictions), thus making performance reporting more 
difficult. A third criticism was that while OMB provided some feedback on their 
assessment of questionnaire responses and desired improvements in program 
performance, more information of this type was needed.  
 
Testimony to Congress by David Walker, the Controller General of the U.S. government, 
and comments by representatives of the General Accounting Office, the Offices of the 
Inspectors General and members of Congress indicate that important institutional 
observers, including the key oversight committees of Congress, have reviewed OMB 
assessment of executive programs and management practices for the FY 2003 and 2004 
budgets. Thus far, according to the U. S. Comptroller General, generally they have been 
supportive of administration efforts (Walker, 2002). 
 
GAO has been very specific in stating that it had reviewed favorably the criteria 
supporting PART and OMB evaluation of department and agency performance. OMB has 
targeted review to improve performance in five areas of management: human resources 
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management productivity, competitive sourcing (i.e., contracting out), financial 
management, e-government, and integration of performance measurement and budgets. 
As noted in the dialogue above, Christopher Mihm of GAO stated that in his view the 
approach and its execution were methodologically sound (Mihm, 2002a). GAO reviews 
of performance management from the late 1990s through 2002 have been supportive 
(GAO, 1996a; 1997a; 1998; 1999b; 2000a; 2000b, Mihm, 2002b). GAO has favored 
performance measurement to the extent that it recommended in 2002 that Congress adopt 
a "Performance Resolution" process to measure and report annually on executive agency 
progress. This approach would function in a manner similar to the Budget Resolution 
process. (Posner, 2002) Such support for performance budget review (as distinct from 
broad-scale performance budgeting) may change, but it is clear that virtually everyone in 
the nation's capitol took serious notice of and responded to the Bush administration OMB 
initiatives with performance measurement and results reporting linked to budgets. Below 
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